Marquette University Law School

Marquette Law Scholarly Commons
Faculty Publications

Faculty Scholarship

1-1-2008

Whither the Pickering Rights of Federal
Employees?
Paul M. Secunda
Marquette University Law School, paul.secunda@marquette.edu

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/facpub
Part of the Law Commons
Publication Information
Paul M. Secunda, Whither the Pickering Rights of Federal Employees?, 79 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1101
(2008). Reprinted with permission of the University of Colorado Law Review and the author.
Repository Citation
Secunda, Paul M., "Whither the Pickering Rights of Federal Employees?" (2008). Faculty Publications. Paper 592.
http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/facpub/592

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
megan.obrien@marquette.edu.

WHITHER THE PICKERING RIGHTS OF
FEDERAL EMPLOYEES?
PAUL M. SECUNDA*
As a result of the Supreme Court's 1983 decision in Bush v.
Lucas, federal employees are not permitted to bring Bivens
constitutional tort claims directly to federal court to vindicate their First Amendment rights to free speech under
Pickering v. Board of Education. Instead, the Bush Court
found that Congress had established an effective, alternative
statutory scheme for vindication of such claims under the
Civil Service Reform Act of 1978. This places federal employees in a less favorable predicament than their state and
local employee counterparts who are able to directly proceed
to court on their First Amendment retaliationclaims under
42 U.S.C. § 1983.
The issue examined in this paper for the first time is whether
the alternative remedy of bringing a First Amendment
Pickering claim to an administrative judge designated by
the Merit Systems Protection Board, and then potentially to
the Board itself, and finally to the Federal Circuit Court of
Appeals, provides meaningful redress for federal employees
with FirstAmendment Pickering claims. An empirical analysis of all First Amendment Pickering cases decided by the
Merit Systems Protection Board and the Federal Circuit
leads to a startlingfinding: an online search has not located
one successful federal employee Pickering claim under the
administrative scheme since the Bush decision in 1983. My
conclusion is that because there is a lack of meaningful redress, Bush v. Lucas should be revisited and overturned,
and a Bivens claim should be implied to vindicate the First
Amendment interests of federal employees.

Associate Professor of Law, Marquette University Law School. I would like to
thank Cindy Estlund, Bill Herbert, Jeff Hirsch, Elaine Mittleman, Jack Preis,
Ross Runkel, and Joe Slater, for providing me with their thought-provoking comments and questions on the arguments in this paper. I would also like to thank
the feedback I received on this paper at presentations at Colorado, Cumberland,
and Seton Hall Law Schools. Of course, all errors or omissions are mine alone.
This Article was selected for the 2007 Seton Hall Employment & Labor Law
Scholars' Forum.
*
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INTRODUCTION

"The importance of Government employees' being assured of
their right to freely comment on the conduct of Government,
to inform the public of abuses of power and of the misconduct of their superiors, must be self-evident in these
times."'

Federal employees lack a meaningful remedy for violations
of their Pickering rights 2 under the First Amendment. Twentyfive years after the United States Supreme Court unanimously
decided Bush v. Lucas3 and held that federal employees could
not bring a Bivens claim 4 against federal officials for violations
of First Amendment free speech rights, the time has come to
revisit the logic of that decision.
The predicate behind Bush was that federal employees had
an effective alternative remedy for their First Amendment
claims under the comprehensive framework of the Civil Service
Reform Act of 1978 ("CSRA of 1978"), 5 and therefore it was unnecessary to directly imply a cause of action under the Constitution. 6 The Bush Court concluded that "claims [that] arise out
of an employment relationship that is governed by comprehensive procedural and substantive provisions giving meaningful
remedies against the United States" do not give rise to "a new
7
judicial remedy" under the Constitution.
Under the CSRA of 1978 administrative scheme, federal
employees must jump through many hoops before being able to
1. Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 228 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
2. "Pickering rights" refer to public employee First Amendment rights to
speech, expression, and association. See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563,
568 (1968) (providing First Amendment speech rights to public employees under
framework designed to balance employees' constitutional rights with public employers' efficiency interests).
3. 462 U.S. 367 (1983).
4. "Bivens claims" are "judicially created damages remed[ies] designed to
vindicate violations of constitutional rights by federal actors." Hall v. Clinton, 235
F.3d 202, 204 (4th Cir. 2000) (citing Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed.
Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 395-97 (1971)).
5. Pub. L. No. 95-454, 92 Stat. 1111 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.).
6. The Court also concluded in Bush that special factors involving Congress'
institutional competence in dealing with federal employment relations counseled
hesitation in implying a constitutional judge-made remedy. Bush, 462 U.S. at
388-90. For reasons further developed below, I also argue that there are no
longer "special factors counseling hesitation" that would prevent implying a
Bivens right in the federal employment free speech context. See infra Part W.A.
7. Bush, 462 U.S. at 368.
HeinOnline -- 79 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1102 2008
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have their constitutional claims reviewed by an Article III
court. They must first file their initial appeal of an agency decision with an administrative law judge ("AJ") designated by
the Merit Systems Protection Board ("MSPB"), then file a petition for review with the MSPB, before finally appealing to the
Federal Circuit Court of Appeals. 8 Even when an Article III
court finally hears the claim, it is heard under a highly deferential standard of review that has historically led to an astronomical affirmation rate of ninety-three to ninety-six percent. 9
Given this convoluted process, perhaps it is not surprising
that the MSPB administrative scheme is not vindicating the
First Amendment Pickering rights of federal employees. 10 But
the extent of the problem is truly extraordinary. A first-time
comprehensive analysis of all MSPB Board" and Federal Circuit cases involving federal employees' First Amendment
Pickering claims leads to a startling discovery: not a single
First Amendment Pickering claim filed by a federal employee

against the employee's agency has ever been successful on the
merits before either of these adjudicatory bodies.12 Additionally,
8. See infra Part III.B.
9. See infra Part III.C.
10. Developments in the Law-Public Employment, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1611,
1635-36 (1984) ('Yet although the [MSPB] has assumed the trappings of judicial
power, a review of the major dimensions of the Board's jurisprudence-including
access to the Board, the standards of review it employs, the remedial powers it
wields, and the reviewability of its decisions in the federal courts-reveals a
marked disposition to circumscribe the protections afforded federal employees.").
11. It is most likely true that some First Amendment Pickering claims have
been successful in front of administrative judges designated by the MSPB to hear
most initial appeals of federal agency personnel decisions. See infra Part III.A.
However, these decisions are not reported and have no precedential value. See
ROBERT G. VAUGHN, MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD: RIGHTS & REMEDIES §
5.01, at 5-2 (rev. ed. 2008) (1984) (citing Horner v. Burns, 793 F.2d 196, 201 (Fed.
Cir. 1986)). Consequently, it is unclear how successful federal employees have
been in these cases overall, but one would think that agencies would frequently
appeal from adverse decisions at the AJ level. One other statistic making it
unlikely that there are many of these cases is the fact that eighty-eight percent of
petitions for review from the AJ level to the MSPB are by employees appealing
adverse decisions. See id.
12. See infra Part III.B, C. Contrariwise, although some commentators have
called success rates under similar constitutional claims against state and local
officials under Section 1983 "dismal," see Stephen W. Dummer, Comment, Secure
Flight and Data Veillance, A New Type of Civil Liberties Erosion: Stripping Your
Rights When You Don't Even Know It, 75 MISS. L.J. 583, 596 n.63 (2006), there
are still plenty of examples of state and local employees prevailing on their First
Amendment claims under Section 1983. For instance, in a study of 1980-1981
filings in the Central District of California, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania,
and the Northern District of Georgia by Professors Schwab and Eisenberg, the average success rate for all civil rights actions (excluding employment discriminaHeinOnline -- 79 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1103 2008
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the number of First Amendment appeals is notably low. 13 The
message that federal employees seem to be receiving is that
their First Amendment claims will not be treated seriously.
Employees are instead left to bring largely ineffective statutory
whistleblowing claims 14 or swallow hard. Such a state of affairs diminishes the ability of courts to protect federal employees' rights using constitution law1 5 and indicates that the
agency and court entrusted to decide these cases lack the necessary neutral competence.
It is somewhat puzzling that federal employees find themselves in this predicament. At first blush, it would seem that
federal employees are endowed with the same free speech protion actions) was thirty percent. Theodore Eisenberg & Stewart Schwab, The Reality of ConstitutionalTort Litigation, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 641, 690-91 (1987).
13. There are only twenty-some MSPB decisions and ten Federal Circuit decisions in the last twenty-five years on First Amendment Pickering claims. See infra notes 255-57 and accompanying text. There are likely thousands of such constitutional tort claims under Section 1983 in any given year.
Eisenberg &
Schwab, supra note 12, at 655 (finding 468 Section 1983 cases in the Central District of California in 1981 alone).
14. Federal employees' whistleblowing claims are brought under the Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989 ("WPA"), Pub. L. No. 101-12, 103 Stat. 16 (codified
at 5 U.S.C. §§ 1211-1219, 1221, 1222, 3352 (2000)). WPA claims have been highly
unsuccessful. See Terry Morehead Dworkin, SOX and Whistleblowing, 105 MICH.
L. REV. 1757, 1766 (2007) ("Among other signs of failure, only one of the 120 appeals brought by whistleblowers to the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals-the designated recipient-has been successful since 1984."); Barbara J. Sapin, Beyond
Garcetti, The Limits of Protection Under the Whistleblower ProtectionAct of 1989,
in RETALIATION AND WHISTLEBLOWING: PROCEEDINGS OF NEW YORK UNIVERSITY
60TH ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR (Paul M. Secunda ed., forthcoming Sept.
2008) (current MSPB Board Member exploring the limits of WPA protection for
federal employees); Jamie Sasser, Comment, Silenced Citizens: The Post-Garcetti
Landscape for Public Sector Employees Working in National Security, 41 U. RICH.
L. REV. 759, 790 (2007) ("Public sector employees simply cannot rely on whistleblower statutes to save them. From 1999 to 2005, only two out of thirty whistleblower claims prevailed before the Merit Systems Protection Board; from 1995 to
2005, only one out of ninety-six claims prevailed before the Federal Circuit.");
Stephen Barr, Speaking Up for the Whistle-Blowers, WASH. POST, Feb. 14, 2007,
at D1 ("Although Congress has passed laws to protect federal employees from reprisals when they speak up, whistle-blower advocates contend that the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which has sole jurisdiction over federal whistleblower cases, has interpreted the laws in a way that makes it almost impossible
for federal employees to defend themselves."); cf. William A. Herbert, Protection
for Public Employees Who "Blow the Whistle" Appear to be Inadequate,N.Y. B. J.,
Feb. 2004, at 20-29 (analyzing similar inadequacies with New York's public sector
statutory whistleblower scheme).
15. See Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 242 (1979) ("[U]nless [constitutional]
rights are to become merely precatory .... litigants who allege that their own constitutional rights have been violated, and who at the same time have no effective
means other than the judiciary to enforce these rights, must be able to invoke the
existing jurisdiction of the courts for ...protection ....").
HeinOnline -- 79 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1104 2008
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tections as state and local public employees under the First
Amendment. Under Pickering v. Board of Education,16 government workers may not be terminated for criticizing their
employers on matters of public concern, 17 unless such expression is uttered pursuant to official duties 18 or substantially interferes with the ability of the government employer to provide
an efficient service to the public. 19 Justice Marshall set forth
the applicable test in Pickering: "The problem in any case is to
arrive at a balance between the interests of the [public employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting
the efficiency of the public services it performs through its em20
ployees."
Pickering and its progeny state no exception or special
treatment for federal employees. 2 1 Indeed, in United States v.
National Treasury Employees Union ("NTEU"),2 2 the Supreme
Court held that federal employees could not, pursuant to the
logic of Pickering, be prohibited from receiving honoraria for
engaging in speech of a public concern on matters unrelated to
their employment. 23 The Supreme Court recently reaffirmed
the validity of its NTEU holding in its City of San Diego v. Roe
per curiam decision. 24 Moreover, the recent scaling back of
Pickering's central holding by Connic v. Myers' public concern
test 2 5 and Garcetti v. Ceballos' official duties test 26 does not indicate that a distinction should be drawn between the First
Amendment rights, whatever their scope, of federal employees
and other types of public employees.
Of course, there is a significant procedural difference between how federal and state employees may bring such First
16.

391 U.S. 563 (1968).

17. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 154-55 (1983).
18. See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 426 (2006).
19. Pickering,391 U.S. at 568.
20. Id.
21. Indeed, the three-judge plurality opinion in Arnett v. Kennedy indicates
that the Pickering balance applies equally to speech claims of federal employees.
416 U.S. 134, 160-61 (1974) (plurality opinion).
22. 513 U.S. 454 (1995).
23. Id. at 468-70.
24. 543 U.S. 77, 81 (2004) (per curiam) (holding that a police officer who sold
explicit videos of himself on eBay did not engage in expression on a matter of public concern and did not qualify for First Amendment protection).
25. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147-48 (1983). See infra notes 44-49 and
accompanying text.
26. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421-422 (2006). See infra notes 37-43
and accompanying text.
HeinOnline -- 79 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1105 2008
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Amendment claims. While state and local employees clearly
have the procedural vehicle of § 198327 to bring constitutional
claims against state and local government employers, federal
employees have no such available statutory claim. 28 Nevertheless, there does not appear to be a good argument for why federal employees should receive different remedies and procedures from their state and local employee counterparts, for the
same unconstitutional conduct. 29 Indeed, in a related context,
the Court argued for parallel treatment of state and federal
employees who violate the constitutional rights of others, recognizing "sound jurisprudential reasons for parallelism, as different standards for claims against state and federal actors
'would be incongruous and confusing.'"30
Consequently, because the administrative scheme set up
for federal employee First Amendment speech claims does not
provide meaningful remedies, and there is no sound argument
why federal employees should have less free speech rights than
state and local employees, an implied Bivens right should be
resurrected in these cases. 3 1 Such protections will not only
benefit employees, but all citizens who depend on public employees to bring a substantial degree of transparency and ac32
countability to our representative government.

27. Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000). See infra notes 62-74
and accompanying text.
28. See Martin A. Schwartz, Claims for Damages for Violations of State Constitutional Rights-Analysis of the Recent Court of Appeals Decision in Brown v.
New York; The Resolved and Unresolved Issues, 14 TOURO L. REV. 657, 660 (1998)
("Section 1983 only covers actions under color of state law; of course, federal officials act under color of federal law.").
29. Federal employees and state employees apparently have the same Fourth
Amendment rights to be free from unreasonable search and seizure in the drug
testing context. See Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656,
677 (1989) (concluding that the immediacy of the government's concern and the
minimal nature of the intrusion outweighed the individual's privacy interest and
permitted the government to drug test federal customs agents).
30. Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 82 (2001) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 499 (1978)).
31. One could argue that because federal courts have traditionally protected
individual's constitutional rights, they should be given greater latitude in implying causes of action under the Constitution. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 407 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring) ("[Tihe judiciary has a particular responsibility to assure the vindication of
constitutional interests .... ). But see Wilkie v. Robbins, 127 S. Ct. 2588, 2608
(2007) (Thomas, J., concurring) (" 'Bivens is a relic of the heady days in which this
Court assumed common-law powers to create causes of action.'" (quoting Malesko,
534 U.S. at 75 (Scalia, J., concurring))).
32. See supra note 1 and accompanying quotation.
HeinOnline -- 79 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1106 2008
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This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I lays out the
new, post-Garcetti five-step analysis for public employees'
Pickering rights. Part II briefly examines the history of Bivens
jurisprudence. The emphasis in this Part is on the Court's conclusion that there is no Bivens right for federal employees
claiming First Amendment Pickering violations as a result of
there being effective, alternative remedies for First Amendment claims under the CSRA of 1978. Part III explores whether federal employees are in fact receiving meaningful redress
under the CSRA of 1978 by examining in detail all First
Amendment Pickering appeals before the MSPB and the Federal Circuit. Because that analysis clearly establishes a lack of
a meaningful remedy, Part IV proposes overturning Bush and
permitting Bivens claims in this context so that employees can
adequately vindicate their First Amendment rights. Alternatively, § 1983 could be amended to additionally cover constitu' 33
tional violations "under color of federal law.
I.

THE FIRST AMENDMENT PICKERING RIGHTS OF PUBLIC
EMPLOYEES: THE FREE SPEECH FIVE-STEP

All public employees, whether state or federal, enjoy some
measure of First Amendment protection. Since the 1968 case
of Pickering v. Board of Education,34 the government, acting in
its employment capacity, has not been able to condition em35
ployment on workers forfeiting their constitutional rights.
Instead, the United States Supreme Court has implicitly asked
whether the restrictions placed by government employers on
36
their employees are reasonable under all the circumstances.
The reasonableness of a public employer's response to public employee speech involves a complicated five-step analysis.
The first step, after the recent case of Garcetti v. Ceballos,3 7 is
33. Richard Henry Seamon, U.S. Torture as a Tort, 37 RUTGERS L.J. 715, 759
(2006) (proposing, in the national security context, a federal statute that would be
identical to Section 1983 except that it would apply to persons acting under fed-

eral law).
34. 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
35. Id. at 568.
36. See Jonathan C. Medow, The First Amendment and the Secrecy State:
Snepp v. United States, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 775, 816 (1982) ("Implicit in Pickering
seems to be a determination that 'reasonableness' is the standard by which to
judge the conditioning of public sector employment on a relinquishment of some
measure of first amendment rights.").
37. 547 U.S. 410 (2006). For a more in-depth discussion of Garcetti and its
facts, see Paul M. Secunda, Garcetti's Impact on the First Amendment Speech
HeinOnline -- 79 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1107 2008
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to ask whether the employee is speaking pursuant to official
duties. 38 In determining what the employee's official duties
are, "[t]he proper inquiry is a practical one" and should focus
'39
on "the duties an employee actually is expected to perform.
If employees are engaged in official duty speech at work, the
Court has held that they are not speaking as citizens and thus
enjoy no First Amendment protection for their speech. 40 Although post-Garcetti litigation is still in its nascent stages, it
appears that much of the litigation will focus on a practical assessment of what the public employee's official duties are, with
employers seeking broad definitions and employees more narrow ones. 4 1 The only thing that is apparently clear concerning
the job-relatedness of speech is that public employee speech
that occurs off-duty and is not work-related (anti-Garcetti
speech) does not come under the Pickering framework at all.
Rather, under the NTEU line of cases, 42 it is protected much
like normal citizen speech. 43
Rights of FederalEmployees, 7 FIRST AMEND. L. REV., (forthcoming 2008).
38. Id. at 421 ("[W]hen public employees make statements pursuant to their
official duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment
purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate their communications from employer discipline.").
39. Id. at 424-25.
40. Id. Interestingly, this holding that government workers cannot act as
employees and citizens at the same time controverts a previous statement of the
Court that a teacher making a presentation before a board of education "spoke
both as an employee and a citizen exercising First Amendment rights." City of
Madison Joint Sch. Dist. No. 8 v. Wis. Employment Relations Comm'n, 429 U.S.
167, 176 n.ll (1976).
41. See, e.g., Morales v. Jones, 494 F.3d 590, 596 (7th Cir. 2007) (citing
Haynes v. City of Circleville, Ohio, 474 F.3d 357 (6th Cir. 2007)); Mayer v. Monroe
County Cmty. Sch. Corp., 474 F.3d 477 (7th Cir. 2007); Green v. Bd. of County
Comm'rs, 472 F.3d 794 (10th Cir. 2007); Freitag v. Ayers, 468 F.3d 528 (9th Cir.
2006); Battle v. Bd. of Regents for the State of Ga., 468 F.3d 755 (lth
Cir. 2006);
Mills v. City of Evansville, 452 F.3d 646 (7th Cir. 2006) (reviewing cases postGarcetti that have examined the scope of an employee's duties from a practical
perspective). For a trenchant criticism of this approach, see Charles W. Rhodes,
Public Employee Speech Rights Fall Prey to an Emerging DoctrinalFormalism, 15
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1173, 1193-94 (2007) ("Although the result may be predictable in cases in which it is undisputed that the speech was made pursuant to
the employee's official duties, the Court has merely shifted the uncertainty to the
scope of the underlying categorization. Rather than the relatively stable balancing
process that had become familiar in these cases, the lower courts are now confronted with an inexact classification prerequisite that is already generating unpredictable results.").
42. United States v. Nat. Treasury Employees Union (NTEU), 513 U.S. 454,
465, 475 (1995).
43. "[W]hen government employees speak or write on their own time on topics
unrelated to their employment, the speech can have First Amendment protection,
absent some governmental justification 'far stronger than mere speculation' in
HeinOnline -- 79 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1108 2008
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Second, if the employee can show that he or she is not
speaking pursuant to official duties, the next step in the
framework concerns whether the employee is speaking out on a
matter of public concern. Under Connick v. Myers," courts are
directed to look at the surrounding content, form, and context
of the speech to see if the speech involves a matter of public
concern. 45 This type of speech "typically [includes] matters
concerning government policies that are of interest to the public at large, a subject on which public employees are uniquely
qualified to comment. '46 Sometimes courts ask whether the
speech addresses a "matter of political, social, or other concern
48
to the community," 47 or is worthy of legitimate news interest.
If the court determines that the speech merely involved purely
private interests, like an employment dispute with one's supervisors, then there is no First Amendment protection for the
speech, because it does not implicate the core concerns of the
49
First Amendment.
Third, if the speech relates to a matter of public concern
not connected to a public employee's official duties, a court then
undertakes a Pickering balance of interests test. Under this
regulating it." City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 80 (2004) (per curiam) (quoting NTEU, 513 U.S. at 465, 475). See also Cynthia L. Estlund, Free Speech Rights
That Work at Work: From the FirstAmendment to Due Process, 54 UCLA L. REV.
1463, 1468 (2007) ("City of San Diego, and its reading of NTEU, appear to place
an outer limit on the additional power of the government over the speech of its
employees. While that outer limit is a bit further from the workplace than one
might have expected, at some point along the spectrum of work-relatedness, the
public employee apparently escapes the Connick-Pickeringniche and recovers her
freedom as a citizen vis-A-vis the government."). Professor Estlund also provides
a very helpful diagram outlining the contours of public employee speech postGarcetti. Id. at 1470.
44. 461 U.S. 138 (1983). For an in-depth consideration of the background in
Connick, see Paul M. Secunda, The (Neglected) Importance of Being Lawrence:
The Constitutionalization of Public Employee Rights to Decisional NonInterference in PrivateAffairs, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 85, 99-102 (2006).
45. Connick, 461 U.S. at 147-48.
46. City of San Diego, 543 U.S. at 80.
47. Connick, 461 U.S. at 146-47.
48. City of San Diego, 543 U.S. at 83-84. The Court itself has recognized,
however, that, "the boundaries of the public concern test are not well defined." Id.
at 83. Past cases provide the best indication about whether speech pertains to a
matter of public concern.
49. Connick, 461 U.S. at 147. Nevertheless, the speech does not have to be
publicly disseminated. Private conversations on matters of public concern may be
protected under the First Amendment. See Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378,
388 n.13 (1987) (recognizing that private, negative comments about the President
can touch on matters of public concern); Givhan v. W. Line Consol. Sch. Dist., 439
U.S. 410, 415-16 (1979) (private conversation between school teacher and principal on racial discrimination at the school was on a matter of public concern).
HeinOnline -- 79 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1109 2008
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balancing test, first developed in the public school teacher case
of Pickering,50 a court weighs the First Amendment interests of
the employee as a citizen against the government interest in
running an efficient government service for the public. 5 1 Here,
courts place much emphasis on whether the employee's speech
causes a substantial disruption in the workplace. 52 Courts
measure substantial disruption, in turn, on such things as "the
impact of the speech on working relationships, the harm
caused by the speech, the public's interest in the speech, and
the employee's relationship to that issue." 53 Paradoxically, this
substantial disruption standard appears to constitutionalize
the heckler's veto and makes most vulnerable that speech
which is the most unpopular and warrants the most protection
under the First Amendment. 54 If the balance under Pickering
favors the government, the public employee has no First
Amendment rights in the speech.
Fourth, if the Pickering balance favors the employee, the
court considers the employee to have engaged in protected
speech. Next, under the evidentiary framework established in
Mount Healthy City School District v. Doyle,5 5 the employee
must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that engaging
in the protected speech was a substantial or motivating factor
56
for the adverse employment action the employee suffered.
Fifth, and finally, if the employee satisfies the causation
standard in step four, the government then has the burden of
persuasion to show that it would have made the same decision
even in the absence of the protected employee speech. 5 7 If the
public employer is successful in meeting this burden, there is
no liability. This is because "[t]he constitutional principle at
stake is sufficiently vindicated if such an employee is placed in
no worse a position than if he had not engaged in the conduct.15 8 Only if the employee can survive this fifth and last ob-

50. 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
51. Id. at 568.
52. Randy J. Kozel, Reconceptualizing Public Employee Speech, 99 NW. U. L.
REV. 1007, 1018 (2005).
53. Rhodes, supra note 41, at 1177.
54. Kozel, supra note 52, at 1018.
55. 429 U.S. 274 (1977).
56. Id. at 287.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 285-86.
HeinOnline -- 79 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1110 2008
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stacle may liability be imposed against the public employer and
59
the employer's responsible agents.
II. SECTION 1983 AND THE BIVENS DOCTRINE
As complicated as the framework is in public employee free
speech cases, in all of these cases the Court consistently used
the term "public employee" to refer to the First Amendment
rights of the employees in question. No distinction was made
between whether the employee was a state or federal employee.
Nevertheless, even though the rights should be the same, the
process by which the rights are vindicated and the remedies
which are available, and against whom, turn out to be different
for federal and state employees.
The first part of this section describes the distinction between the constitutional rights of federal employees and state
and local employees. The second part of this section describes
the implied constitutional remedy that exists against federal
agents under the Bivens line of cases. Finally, the last part explains how Bush v. Lucas prevents federal employees from
bringing First Amendment claims against their employers under Bivens.
A.

The Section 1983 Distinction

Plaintiffs brought most of the public employment free
speech cases discussed in the previous section pursuant to the
Civil Rights Act of 1871, now referred to by its place in the U.S.
Code, § 1983.60 To bring a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must show
59. But even then, state employers may be able to avail themselves of sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment, and responsible agents of the
employers may be able to avoid individual damages liability if they show they are
eligible for qualified immunity, though they may still be subject to injunctive relief. See ERWIN CHEMERINsKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 8.6.3, at 529 (4th ed.
2003) ("Qualified immunity exists only as to suits for damages, not as to suits for
injunctive relief."). Qualified immunity is applicable if a reasonable person would
not have known that his or her conduct violated clearly established constitutional
rights. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) ("[G]overnment officials
performing discretionary functions[ ] generally are shielded from liability for civil
damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known."). See also
infra Part III.A.
60. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000) ("Every person who, under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State ... subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
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that there was a deprivation of a federally guaranteed right
and that the defendant was acting "under color of' state law. 6 1
Section 1983 is not substantive; it merely provides a procedural
vehicle for plaintiffs to bring constitutional claims against state
and local officials. 6 2 The purpose of such claims is to "vindicate
constitutional rights and deter violations through suits brought
by injured persons to stop government illegality and to obtain
'6 3
damages for injuries already suffered.
Section 1983 claims can be brought directly in federal
court 64 against institutions acting under color of state law or
individuals acting in their official or individual capacities. 6 5
However, there is no respondeat superior liability under §
1983.66 Consequently, institutional claims are limited to situations where a plaintiff proves a causal link between the institutional policy or custom of the state actor and the plaintiffs injury. 67 Even then, sovereign immunity under the Eleventh
Amendment bars plaintiffs from collecting money damage
claims against state institutions in most situations.6 8 Although
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit
in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress .... ").
61. Id. As far as what constitutes action under state law in the public employment context, the critical inquiry is "whether the [public employee] was acting
pursuant to the power he/she possessed by state authority or acting only as a private individual." Edwards v. Wallace Cmty. Coll., 49 F.3d 1517, 1523 (11th Cir.
1995) (citing Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 184 (1961)). Generally, this is not an
issue in employment cases, as "state employment is generally sufficient to render
the defendant a state actor." Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 936 n.18
(1982).
62. See Paul M. Secunda, At the Crossroads of Title IX and a New "IDEA":
Why Bullying Need Not Be 'A Normal Part of Growing Up" for Special Education
Children, 12 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 1, 21-22 (2005) (citing Chapman v.
Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 617 (1979)).
63. Michael L. Wells, Section 1983, The First Amendment, and Public Employee Speech: Shaping the Right to Fit the Remedy (and Vice Versa), 35 GA. L.
REV. 939, 944 (2001).
64. There is no requirement of exhaustion of state judicial remedies under
Section 1983. See Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 472-73 (1974).
65. Monell v. Dep't. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). Actions against
individuals in their official capacities are handled under the same standards that
apply to actions against institutions. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165
(1985) (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 690 n.55).
66. Monell, 436 U.S. at 691-93.
67. Id. at 694.
68. Will v. Mich. Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66 (1989) ("Section 1983
provides a federal forum to remedy many deprivations of civil liberties, but it does
not provide a federal forum for litigants who seek a remedy against a State for alleged deprivations of civil liberties. The Eleventh Amendment bars such suits
unless the State has waived its immunity or unless Congress has exercised its
undoubted power under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to override that immuHeinOnline -- 79 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1112 2008
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this makes it difficult to recover damages against state employers for constitutional violations, local government employers generally do not fall under the Eleventh Amendment and
69
may still be sued for monetary relief.
On the other hand, individual defendants in § 1983 cases
70
may assert a qualified immunity defense to damage claims.
Under this theory, individual state and local officials are only
liable if a reasonable official would have known that he or she
was violating a constitutional standard that was "clearly established at the time" of the action. 7 1 Even if qualified immunity
is available, however, a § 1983 plaintiff can still receive injunctive relief against the targeted state or local official. 72 Prevailing plaintiffs may also be entitled to attorneys' fees under
73
§1988.
No statute similar to § 1983 exists for constitutional violations against federal employees and their agencies. 7 4 This is
nity.") (citation omitted).
69. Monell, 436 U.S. at 690 & nn.53-54 (holding that a municipality is a "person" under Section 1983, and therefore local government units that are not considered part of the State are not able to take advantage of Eleventh Amendment
immunity). Local governments are not entitled to a qualified immunity defense
when damages are sought against them, see Owen v. City of Independence, 445
U.S. 622, 638 (1980), but may not be sued for punitive damages, see City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 258-70 (1981). Punitive damages are
also very hard to recover in the First Amendment retaliation context against individual defendants. See Wells, supra note 63, at 974-75 ("Punitive damages are
rarely available in First Amendment retaliation cases, for they may be awarded
only where the defendant's conduct was highly improper.").
70. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 247-48 (1974).
71. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818-19 (1982).
72. "Of course a state official in his or her official capacity, when sued for injunctive relief, would be a person under § 1983 because 'official-capacity actions
for prospective relief are not treated as actions against the State."' Will, 491 U.S.
at 71 n.10 (quoting Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 167 n.14 (1985); Exparte
Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159-60 (1908)).
73. Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (2000). The
Eleventh Amendment does not bar recovery of attorney's fees from the state itself.
Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 692 (1978). However, a state is not liable for attorney's fees where the plaintiff sues the individual officer in his or her individual
capacity. Graham, 473 U.S. at 167-68.
74. See supra note 28 and accompanying text. However, tort claims against
federal employees may be brought against the United States under the Federal
Tort Claims Act ("FTCA"), 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680 (2000). Under the FTCA,
"[t]he United States shall be liable, respecting the provisions of this title relating
to tort claims, in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual
under like circumstances, but shall not be liable for interest prior to judgment or
for punitive damages." 28 U.S.C. § 2674. The FTCA is the exclusive remedy in
such cases, see United States v. Smith, 499 U.S. 160, 165-69 (1991), and government liability provided in the Act is limited by many exceptions, see Lawrence
Rosenthal, A Theory of Governmental Damages Liability: Torts, Constitutional
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somewhat surprising given that the Court "recognized sound
jurisprudential reasons for parallelism, as different standards
for claims against state and federal actors 'would be incongruous and confusing."' 75 Yet, the Court never expressly held that
federal employees must have the same rights against their supervisors and their agencies as their state counterparts. 76
Rather, the Court judicially created a damages remedy against
federal officials who violate individuals' constitutional rights.
It is to an explication of this Bivens doctrine that this Article
now turns.
B.

Implying Actions for Money Damages for
ConstitutionalViolations by FederalAgents

Prior to 1971, a cause of action for money damages against
federal agents who violated an individual's constitutional
rights did not exist. 77 In Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents
of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 78 the United States Supreme Court, for the first time, implied a cause of action for
money damages against federal officers 79 who violated the constitutional rights of individuals. Bivens involved the arrest and
search of a man by the Federal Bureau of Narcotics. 80 The
man sued the individual federal officers involved in the incident, alleging that the arrest and search were carried out in
violation of the Fourth Amendment's command against unreasonable search and seizure, 8 1 and that the unlawful conduct

Torts, and Takings, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 797, 804 (2007) (reviewing limitations).
75. Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 82 (2001) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 499 (1978)).
76. Id.
77. There have been unsuccessful Congressional attempts to legislate constitutional tort claims against the United States. See FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471,
486 n.l1 (1994) (citing H.R. 440, 99th Cong. (1st Sess. 1985); H.R. 595, 98th Cong.
(1st Sess. 1983); S. 1775, 97th Cong. (1st Sess. 1981); H.R. 2659, 96th Cong. (1st
Sess. 1979)).
78. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
79. However, "[s]overeign immunity bars an action seeking to recover damages from the federal government itself for a constitutional tort." Rosenthal, supra note 74, at 815 (citing Meyer, 510 U.S. at 477).
80. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 389. The Fed. Bureau of Narcotics was a predecessor
agency of the Drug Enforcement Agency.
81. U.S. CONST. amend. IV ("The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated .... ).
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caused him humiliation, embarrassment, and mental suffer82
ing.
The Court started from the premise that, "'it is . . . well
settled that where legal rights have been invaded, and a federal statute provides for a general right to sue for such invasion, federal courts may use any available remedy to make
good the wrong done."' 83 It then held the plaintiff should also
have a claim for money damages against the federal agents
who violated his Fourth Amendment rights. 84 In this manner,
the Court sought to subject federal officials to the same type of
constraints state officials are under when dealing with the fundamental rights of United States citizens,8 5 and to deter individual federal officers from acting unconstitutionally.8 6
Nevertheless, the Court limited this newly-minted Bivens
right for future claims by a two-step analysis. Under the first
step, "there is the question whether any alternative, existing
process for protecting the interest amounts to a convincing reason for the Judicial Branch to refrain from providing a new and
freestanding remedy in damages. ' 87 In other words, where
Congress already provided an adequate remedial scheme for
constitutional violations, it is unnecessary for the Court to craft
a judge-made remedy. 8 8 But even if no such alternative exists,
a court must apply the second step of the analysis and under-

82. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 389-90.
83. Id. at 396 (quoting Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946)).
84. Id. at 397.
85. Wilkie v. Robbins, 127 S. Ct. 2588, 2618 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) ("Thirty-six years ago, the Court created the Bivens
remedy. In doing so, it assured that federal officials would be subject to the same
constraints as state officials in dealing with the fundamental rights of the people
who dwell in this land."); see also id. ("The Bivens analog to § 1983 ... is hardly
an obscure part of the Court's jurisprudence.").
86. Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 70 (2001). But see Bivens, 403
U.S. at 407-08 (Harlan, J., concurring) ("I agree with the Court that the appropriateness of according Bivens compensatory relief does not turn simply on the
deterrent effect liability will have on federal official conduct.").
87. Wilkie, 127 S. Ct. at 2598 (citing Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 378 (1983)).
Somewhat confusingly, this was the second step of the analysis set out in Carlson
v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 18-19 (1980), and the second step, involving "special factors
counseling hesitation," was the first. Id. at 18. The majority opinion by Justice
Souter in Wilkie gives no indication why the order of the analysis was reversed.
88. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 397 ("For we have here no explicit congressional declaration that persons injured by a federal officer's violation of the Fourth Amendment may not recover money damages from the agents, but must instead be remitted to another remedy, equally effective in the view of Congress."); see also id.
at 410 (Harlan., J., concurring) ("For people in Bivens' shoes, it is damages or
nothing.").
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take a "remedial determination that is appropriate for a common-law tribunal, paying particular heed. .. to any special factors counseling hesitation before authorizing a new kind of fed89
eral litigation."
Although Justice Brennan's opinion in Bivens is fairly
straightforward, Justice Harlan's concurrence adds some important insights into the analysis. More specifically, Justice
Harlan addresses "whether the power to authorize damages as
a judicial remedy for the vindication of a federal constitutional
right is placed by the Constitution itself exclusively in Congress' hands." 90 In other words, Harlan did not believe the existence of a damage remedy for constitutional violations should
depend on Congressional legislative grace. Instead, he concluded:
[I]f a general grant of jurisdiction to the federal courts by
Congress is thought adequate to empower a federal court to
grant equitable relief for all areas of subject-matter jurisdiction enumerated therein, then it seems to me that the same
a federal court to grant a
statute is sufficient to empower
91
traditional remedy at law.
On another significant point, Justice Harlan responded to
a suggestion Chief Justice Burger made in his dissent that constitutional violations by federal officers should be decided by
92
quasi-judicial or administrative agencies created by Congress.
Disagreeing with Burger's suggestion, Harlan wrote, "the judiciary has a particular responsibility to assure the vindication of
constitutional interests such as those embraced by the Fourth
Amendment. ' 93 Harlan thought this especially applicable
where "the Bill of Rights is particularly intended to vindicate
the interests of the individual in the face of the popular will as
expressed in legislative majorities." 94 Nonetheless, he also
89. Wilkie, 127 S. Ct. at 2598 (quoting Bush, 462 U.S. at 378). This "special
factors counseling hesitation" language derives from Bivens, where the Court
noted that a damage action was appropriate because the case involved "no special
factors counseling hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by Congress."
Bivens, 403 U.S. at 396.
90. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 401-02 (Harlan, J., concurring).
91. Id. at 405 (citation omitted). See also Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 378
(1983) ("The federal courts' statutory jurisdiction to decide federal questions confers adequate power to award damages to the victim of a constitutional violation.").
92. Id. at 422 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
93. Id. at 407 (Harlan, J., concurring).
94. Id. See also JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 73-104 (1980).
HeinOnline -- 79 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1116 2008

2008]

FEDERAL EMPLOYEE PICKERING RIGHTS

1117

noted that the Court should think about policy considerations
for and against adopting such an implied constitutional right,
much in the way that the legislature does. 9 5 Weighing the
relevant policy considerations in Bivens, Justice Harlan concluded that there was not any substantial governmental policy
that would be violated by recognizing a non-statutory damage
remedy against federal officials allegedly responsible for a
96
Fourth Amendment violation.
After Bivens, the Court extended its reasoning to two additional contexts: employment discrimination suits against Congressional members for violations of the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause, 97 and
cruel and unusual punishment actions by prisoners against
federal prison officials under the Eighth Amendment. 98 However, although Bivens has not been overruled, 9 9 it has not been
applied to any new types of cases since 1980.100 In 2007, the
Court stated:
[A]ny freestanding damages remedy for a claimed constitutional violation has to represent a judgment about the best
way to implement a constitutional guarantee; it is not an
automatic entitlement no matter what other means there
may be to vindicate a protected interest, and in most instances we have found a Bivens remedy unjustified. 10 1
Even more to the point, in 2001, the Malesko Court held
that a Bivens remedy would be limited to instances where there
was either no other cause of action against individual officers
alleged to have acted unconstitutionally or where a plaintiff
lacked any alternative remedy for harms caused by an individual officer's unconstitutional conduct. 102 Based on this restric95. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 407 (Harlan, J., concurring).
96. Id. at 408-10.
97. See Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979).
98. See Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980).
99. At least two current Justices, Scalia and Thomas, would like to see Bivens
and its progeny limited "'to the precise circumstances that they involved."' See
Wilkie v. Robbins, 127 S. Ct. 2588, 2608 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting
Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 75 (2001) (Scalia, J., concurring)).
100. Malesko, 534 U.S. at 68 ("Since Carlson we have consistently refused to
extend Bivens liability to any new context or new category of defendants."). See
also Ryan D. Newman, Note, From Bivens to Malesko and Beyond: Implied Constitutional Remedies and the Separation of Powers, 85 TEX. L. REV. 471, 474
(2006) ("Although Bivens remains good law, in practice it seems a dead letter.").
101. Wilkie, 127 S. Ct. at 2597.
102. Malesko, 534 U.S. at 70.
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tive approach toward such claims, the Court refused to find
Bivens remedies for claims involving: harm to military personnel through service activity, 10 3 wrongful denials of Social Security benefits, 10 4 and retaliation against the exercise of owner10 5
ship rights under the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause.
The refusal of the current conservative Court to apply
Bivens to other scenarios led Justice Ginsburg to suggest to
Congress "to codify and further define the Bivens remedy" if it
wanted federal officials to be subject to the same civil rights liability as state and local officials. 10 6 The next section examines
whether that might indeed be the most appropriate course after reviewing the current state of federal employees' First
Amendment rights under Bivens.
C. Application of Bivens to FederalEmployment: Bush v.
Lucas
Given the focus of this Article on federal employees' First
Amendment rights, Bush v. Lucas is the Court's most signifi10 7
cant holding with regard to the scope of the Bivens remedy.
Bush involved the demotion of a federal employee for allegedly
making protected First Amendment statements critical of his
federal agency. 10 8 Although he appealed the adverse personnel
decision to the Civil Service Commission and was reinstated
with retroactive seniority and full back pay, 10 9 under the administrative scheme he was not able to receive compensatory
damages for emotional distress, punitive damages, or attorneys' fees against the individual federal official.1 10 There was,
103. See United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669 (1987); see also Chappell v.
Wallace, 462 U.S. 296 (1983).
104. See Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412 (1988). Based on the language of
the Bivens decision itself, and in order to further the deterrent functions of such
individual damage actions, the Court has also held that Bivens actions may only
be brought against individuals, not against federal agencies, or against private
prisons acting on behalf of the State. See, e.g., Malesko, 534 U.S. at 61; FDIC v.
Meyer, 510 U.S. 471 (1994).
105. Wilkie, 127 S. Ct. at 2604-05.
106. Id. at 2618 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
107. 462 U.S. 367 (1983).
108. Id. at 369-71.
109. His first appeal was denied by the Federal Employee Appeals Authority,
the predecessor to the MSPB, but was later upheld by Civil Service Commission's
Appeal Review Board which applied the balancing of interests test under
Pickering. Id. at 370-71. The Board awarded Bush reinstatement and $30,000 in
back pay. Id. at 386 n.29.
110. Id. at 371-72 & nn.8-9.
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therefore, some issue over whether the administrative remedy
adequately deterred unconstitutional conduct against the federal employee by his federal supervisor.III
Although the Court assumed that the administrative remedies did not provide complete relief for the plaintiff as effective
as the Bivens damages remedy, 112 the Court nevertheless
unanimously 1 13 concluded that a Bivens remedy did not exist
under the First Amendment "aris[ing] out of an employment
relationship that is governed by comprehensive procedural and
substantive provisions giving meaningful remedies against the
United States."1 14 More specifically, under the first step of the
Bivens analysis, the Court found an effective, alternative remedy under the Civil Service Commission regulations.1 1 5 The
Court defined its mission as making a "policy judgment ... informed by a thorough understanding of the existing regulatory
structure and the respective costs and benefits that would result from the addition of another remedy for violations of employees' First Amendment rights." 11 6 Under this test, the
Court found these civil service regulations to be "an elaborate
remedial system that has been constructed step by step, with
careful attention to conflicting policy considerations," 1 7 and it
was unnecessary to "interfere with Congress' carefully cali1 18
brated system."
Even Justice Brennan, the author of the original Bivens
decision, agreed with the outcome in Bush, writing in a later
case that, "I agree that in appropriate circumstances we should
defer to a congressional decision to substitute alternative relief

S11. Id. at 372 n.8.
112. Id. at 388 ("[E]xisting remedies do not provide complete relief for the
plaintiff.").
113. Justices Marshall and Blackmun concurred to register their belief that a
similar case might come out differently if there were not a comprehensive scheme
to provide full compensation for a constitutional violation that was substantially
as effective as a damage action under the constitution. Id. at 390 (Marshall, J.,
concurring).
114. Id. at 368 (majority opinion).
115. Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 388 (1983).
116. Id.
117. Id. This elaborate scheme was established by a series of federal civil service laws including: the Pendleton Act of 1883, 22 Stat. 403; the Lloyd-LaFollette
Act of 1912, 37 Stat. 539; the Veterans Preference Act of 1944, 58 Stat. 387; the
Backpay Act of 1966, 80 Stat. 94; and the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, 92
Stat. 1111.
118. Wilkie v. Robbins, 127 S. Ct. 2588, 2612 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
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for a judicially created remedy." 119 Brennan believed a substitute alternative remedy under the CSRA of 1978 was an appropriate circumstance because Congress developed the scheme
over nearly a hundred years and 'constitutional challenges...
are fully cognizable' and prevailing employees are entitled not
only to full backpay, but to retroactive promotions, seniority,
120
pay raises, and accumulated leave."'
Furthermore, the Court found special factors counseling
hesitation under the second part of the Bivens analysis. In
particular, the Bush Court "recognized Congress' institutional
competence in crafting appropriate relief for aggrieved federal
employees as a 'special factor counseling hesitation in the creation of a new remedy." ' 12 1 In this regard, the Court observed
that Congress could more expertly evaluate the effect of a new
12 2
litigation right for federal employees than could the Court.
It was not for the Court to decide whether it would be good policy to permit a federal employee to recover damages against
government officials in circumstances where Congress had already carried out the necessary balancing of employee rights
and government efficiency interests. 12 3 Indeed, recognizing a
cause of action for constitutional violations in the federal employment relations "could upset Congress' careful structuring
12 4
of federal employment relations."
Consequently, since 1983, federal employees have had to
vindicate their First Amendment rights under an administrative scheme that provides less than complete relief. 12 5 This is
not to say that these employees should not have their First
Amendment claims analyzed under the Pickering framework
for public employee free speech claims. 126 They do. The difference is that the framework will initially be applied by an AJ

119.

Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 431 (1988) (Brennan, J., dissenting).

120. Id. at 436 (quoting Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 386, 388 (1983)).
121.
U.S. at
122.
123.
124.
125.

Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 68 (2001) (citing Bush, 462
380).
Bush, 462 U.S. at 389.
Id.
Schweiker, 487 U.S. at 441 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Estlund, supra note 43, at 1484 ("[T]he important point [of Bush] is the

Court's conclusion that the administrative procedures and remedies of the civil
service laws afford sufficient protection even for speech that is clearly protected by
the First Amendment.") (emphasis added).
126. Indeed, the federal employee in Bush was successful after the Civil Service Commission Appeals Review Board applied the Pickering balance and found
in the employee's favor. Bush, 462 U.S. at 370-71.
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appointed by the MSPB. 127 Also, even if liability is found, an
adjudicator will limit the damages to equitable relief and back
pay. The federal employee will not be eligible for compensatory
or punitive damages, and the tribunal will award attorney's
fees on a more discretionary basis. 128 Moreover, the current
framework diminishes the deterrence function of the Bivens
remedy because no individual liability exists against the federal officials responsible for the First Amendment deprivation.
All this seems to suggest that the current remedies available to
federal employees hardly act as a substitute remedy for a
Bivens-type claim in the First Amendment federal employment
relations context.
Nevertheless, the Court's focus in Bivens, and subsequently in Bush v. Lucas, concerns whether the administrative
remedy provides meaningful redress to those federal employees
bringing First Amendment claims. 12 9 It is therefore necessary
to examine in some detail the status of First Amendment retaliation claims under the CSRA of 1978.130 To the extent that
federal employees are not receiving similar treatment for their
claims from the MSPB or the Federal Circuit, this alternative
scheme is not providing a meaningful remedy. Justice Marshall is correct that a case like Bush v. Lucas should be decided
differently in an environment in which Congress' comprehensive scheme is not providing "full compensation to civil service
employees who are discharged or disciplined in violation of
their First Amendment rights, and that [does not] afford[ ] a
' 13 1
remedy that is substantially as effective as a damage action.

127. For more detail about the MSPB and the role it plays under the Civil Service Act of 1978, see generally Part III.A.
128. 5 U.S.C. §§ 7701(g), 1221(g), 1214(g) (2000); 5 C.F.R. §§ 1201.2011201.204 (2008).
129. Bush, 462 U.S. at 386 ("[T]he Government's comprehensive scheme is
costly to administer, but it provides meaningful remedies for employees who may
have been unfairly disciplined for making critical comments about their agencies.") (emphasis added).
130. Professor Estlund has denominated this question as crucial to whether it
makes sense to re-cast public employee First Amendment speech claims into liberty interests due some form of procedural process under the due process clause.
See Estlund, supra note 43, at 1495 ("How good will administrative decisionmakers be at weighing free speech concerns against managers' claims of institutional
imperative?").
131. Bush, 462 U.S. at 390 (Marshall, J., concurring). See also Schweiker v.
Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 423 (1988) ("When the design of a Government program
suggests that Congress has provided what it considers adequate remedial mechanisms for constitutional violations that may occur in the course of its administration, we have not created additional Bivens remedies.").
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Also, to the extent that the MSPB process is not working the
way that it should, it undermines the argument concerning
"special factors counseling hesitation" under which courts
should defer to the institutional competence of Congress to decide these matters of federal employment law.
III. FEDERAL EMPLOYEE FIRST AMENDMENT CLAIMS AND THE
MSPB
The following section considers how effectively the MSPB
and the Federal Circuit have handled federal employees' First
Amendment Pickering claims and whether federal employees,
nearly twenty-five years after Bush, are receiving any semblance of meaningful redress for their constitutional claims.
The section commences with a brief history of civil service laws
in the United States before considering in depth both the structure of the MSPB and the Federal Circuit. It concludes by examining how these adjudicative bodies have handled First
Amendment speech claims of federal employees.
A.

The History of Civil Service Law and Current Civil
Service Regulations

As the Court indicated in Bush v. Lucas, the federal civil
service system in the United States is a product of many incremental legislative steps over 100 years, starting with the
enactment of the Pendleton Act in 1883.132 The Pendleton Act
established the Civil Service Commission, which aimed to defeat the spoils system and select federal public employees
based on merit by using a competitive examination. 133 Under
Section 13, the Pendleton Act provided that employees could
not be required to make political contributions or be politically
influenced at the risk of being terminated. 134 Over the next
century, civil service laws were amended to provide federal
employees with various employment rights, including just
cause protection from termination, and from other adverse employment actions, 135 unless such termination would promote
the efficiency of the civil service. 13 6 Additional laws provided
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

22 Stat. 403.
Bush, 462 U.S. at 381.
See 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(3) (2000).
Veterans Preference Act of 1944, 58 Stat. 387.
Lloyd-LaFollette Act of 1912, 37 Stat. 539, 555, §6 ("no person in the clasHeinOnline -- 79 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1122 2008
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back pay and other make-whole relief for unlawful adverse employment actions. 137 Importantly, in the Lloyd-LaFollette Act
of 1912, Congress decided that granting free speech rights to
federal employees was not counter to the efficient operation of
13 8
the civil service.
However, having the Civil Service Commission both prosecute and adjudicate federal employee personnel claims proved
unworkable.
Consequently, Congress passed the CSRA of
1978,139 establishing a new adjudicative body, the MSPB, to
hear prohibited personnel action claims involving civil service
members. 140 Further, in 1982, Congress required that the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals hear all appeals from MSPB deci14 1
sions.
The CSRA of 1978 set up an elaborate and comprehensive
procedural and substantive framework for dealing with federal
civil servants' First Amendment claims. 142 Under this framework, substantive provisions prohibit arbitrary actions by federal supervisors, and procedural provisions provide administrative remedies for addressing unlawful actions taken against the
employee.143
Substantively, the CSRA of 1978 established specific "prohibited personnel practices," including unlawful discriminatory
actions, politically coercive actions, and retaliatory actions for
whistleblowing. 144 Significantly, for purposes of this Article,

sified Civil Service of the United States shall be removed therefrom except for
such cause as will promote the efficiency of said service and for reasons given in
writing .... "). The purpose of this legislation, in part, was to protect the free
speech rights of civil service employees. H.R. REP. No. 62-388, at 7 (1912).
137. Back Pay Act of 1966, 80 Stat. 94; Back Pay Act of 1948, 62 Stat. 354.
138. Bush, 462 U.S. at 384.
139. Pub. L. No. 95-454, 92 Stat. 1111 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.).
140. 5 U.S.C. § 7701 (2000). The CSA of 1978 also established two other independent agencies: the Office of Personnel Management and the Federal Labor Relations Authority.
141. Id. § 7703; Federal Court Improvement Act of 1982, 28 U.S.C. § 1295
(2000).
142. Bush, 462 U.S. at 385.
143. Id. The administrative scheme does not protect all civil servants. For instance, probationary employees are excluded, 5 U.S.C. § 7511 (2000), as are those
employees who have been appointed by the President, 5 C.F.R. § 752.401(d)(1), (3)
(2008), have jobs which have "confidential, policy-determining, policy-making, or
policy-advocating character," or are determined by the President to be excluded
from coverage for conditions of good administration. 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(B)(i),
(ii) (2000). The law also provides that those suspended for fourteen days or less
have no right to appeal a federal agency's decision. Id. § 7503.
144. 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(1), (3), (8), (9) (2000). Federal employees may also
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federal civil servants are able to bring First Amendment claims
under this scheme for personnel decisions based on the employee's disapproving or controversial comments about the
agency. 145
Procedurally, for an agency to remove an employee from
his or her position, the burden is on the agency to show that
such a removal would promote the efficiency of the service. 146
Before this can happen, however, the agency must give the employee thirty days notice of a proposed adverse employment action, and the notice must contain reasons for the action. 14 7 The
employee, who may be represented by an attorney or another
representative, is then given seven days to respond to the proposed action, and before taking final action, the agency must
14 8
supply reasons for its decision.
The employee may appeal the adverse decision under an
applicable internal grievance procedure or to an AJ designated
by the MSPB, but not both.14 9 The AJ holds "a trial-type hearing at which the employee c[an] present witnesses, crossexamine the agency's witnesses, and secure the attendance of
agency officials." 150 The AJ is required to issue a written decision. 15 1 Successful employees are entitled to "make-whole" relief including reinstatement with back pay, but are not entitled

bring claims under the Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989 (WPA), Pub. L. No.
101-12, 103 Stat. 16 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.). Congress passed the WPA in light of federal government studies in 1980 and 1983
showing that, "[a] large percentage of Federal employees were reluctant to report
instances of illegal or wasteful activities they had observed. Further, among those
who did report such activities, a significant percentage felt they experienced some
form of reprisal as a result." Cynthia L. Estlund, Free Speech and Due Process in
the Workplace, 71 IND. L. J. 101, 119 n.71 (1995) (citing U.S. MERIT SYSTEMS
PROTECTION BOARD, WHISTLEBLOWING IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT: AN UPDATE (1993)). It does not appear, however, that the WPA has resolved the problem it was enacted to address. See supra note 14.
145. Bush, 462 U.S. at 386 ("Constitutional challenges to agency action, such
as the First Amendment claims raised by petitioner, are fully cognizable within
this [administrative] system.").
146. 5 U.S.C. § 7513(a) (2006); 5 U.S.C. § 7701(c)(1) (2006) (placing the burden
on the agency for the merits of the case); 5 C.F.R. § 1201.56(a)(1)(ii) (2008).
147. 5 U.S.C. § 7513(b)(1).
148. 5 U.S.C. § 7513(b)(2)-(4).
149. 5 C.F.R. § 752.405(b) (2008). There may be reasons to believe that employees fare better under a negotiated grievance process under this scheme. See
infra note 261. However, the focus of this paper is on the efficacy of the AJ/MSPB
system.
150. Bush, 462 U.S. at 387 (citing 5 C.F.R. § 772.307(c) (2008)). See generally 5
U.S.C. § 7701 (2006); 5 C.F.R. § 1200 (2008).
151. 5 U.S.C. § 7701(b)(1).
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to compensatory or punitive damages. 152 Attorney's fees can be
153
awarded by the MSPB on a discretionary basis.
If the employee does not win at the AJ/initial appeal level,
he or she may file a petition for review with the MSPB. Regardless of whether the MSPB accepts review, the employee
may appeal to the Federal Circuit. 154 However, the employee
will not be entitled to a full review of his or her claims before
the Federal Circuit, as would a plaintiff asserting a Bivens
claim in front of a federal trial court. Instead, the Federal Circuit reviews the MSPB's or AJ's decision under a highly defer155
ential arbitrary and capricious standard.
Overall, this federal civil service administrative scheme
has advantages and disadvantages compared to a direct Bivens
damage action under the Constitution. Disadvantages include
a lack of the following: access to an impartial Article III court
(and the politically appointed members of the MSPB in the
court's stead), jury trials, 156 the ability to obtain compensatory
and punitive damages, full appeal rights in front of the Federal
Circuit, 157 and the ability to bring claims for money damages
against individuals responsible for the violation of constitutional rights (and therefore, a loss of significant deterrence interests). Attorney's fees are also more discretionary under the
administrative model. 158 On the one hand, the administrative
process is advantageous to employees, as it places the burden
of proof on the agency, 159 gives employees due process rights
which might provide more effective protection for speech than
First Amendment rights alone, 160 negates the need to argue
152. Id.
153. 5 U.S.C. § 7701(g)(1) (adopting "interest of justice" standard for most adverse employment action cases).
154. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1), (d) (2006).
155. "The decision of the MSPB must be affirmed unless we find it to be arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law;
obtained without procedures required by law, rule, or regulation having been followed; or unsupported by substantial evidence." Holland v. Dep't of Air Force, 31
F.3d 1118, 1120 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (citing 5 U.S.C. § 7703(c)).
156. See Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 22-23 (1980).
157. See Chandler v. Roudebush, 425 U.S. 840, 851-53 (1976).
158. Allen v. U.S. Postal Service, 2 M.S.P.R. 420, 429 (1980) ("The circumstances justifying the award of attorney's fees is left to the discretionof the Board
to develop in light of its experience. The award of attorney's fees should not become,
however, the ordinary practice in cases which the employee wins.") (emphasis in
original).
159. See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
160. This is the argument advanced by Professor Estlund. See Estlund, supra
note 144, at 124 ("[T]hose employees who enjoy independent due process rightswho cannot be fired without a good reason or without notice and a hearingHeinOnline -- 79 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1125 2008
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against qualified immunity in order to obtain damages, 16 1 and
provides a process that is likely to be more accessible, quicker,
62
and less costly. 1
To determine whether the advantages of the MSPB process
for deciding First Amendment claims of federal employees outweigh the disadvantages, it is necessary to consider whether
the established alternative remedy to a direct constitutional
claim is providing "meaningful redress" to impacted federal
employees. In other words, it is necessary to explore how the
MSPB and the Federal Circuit have been handling federal employees' First Amendment retaliation claims to determine
whether a Bivens remedy is necessary in this sub-class of
cases. 163 The next two subsections focus on this topic.
B.

The MSPB Experience HandlingFirstAmendment
Pickering Claims

Protection for civil service federal employees who speak
out on controversial issues of public concern has never been
good. Indeed, the state of affairs was so bleak that Congress
passed the Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989 ("WPA") 164 as
an attempt to give federal employees more protection from retaliation for exercise of First Amendment rights in the workshould be expected to enjoy much greater freedom of expression as well.").
I
wonder, however, whether in a potentially politicized environment like the MSPB,
whether such procedural rights will really help. Although civil servants have the
advantage of putting the burden on agencies to "reasonably investigate and
evaluate whatever facts it is relying upon before imposing serious discipline," id.
at 128-29, the danger is that such investigations will be form over substance
where political considerations are involved and illustrates another reason why the
independent Article III court is necessary. On the other hand, if due process is
defined as "the right to notice of the charges and to a hearing before an impartial
decisionmaker at which the employer must show just cause for discipline or discharge and the employee may respond," id. at 129, I do not believe that federal
employees are entitled to an impartial decisionmaker pre-termination under
Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 546 (1985). Moreover, the
MSPB, as discussed below, seems far from an impartial post-termination administrative decisionmaker. See infra Part III.B.
161. See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 508-17 (1978) (applying Section
1983 qualified immunity standard for state officials to federal officials).
162. See Estlund, supra note 144, at 129 ("The administrative process for adjudicating just cause discharges is much cheaper and more prompt, and consequently more accessible to most employees, than civil litigation.").
163. "The question is obviously crucial: If administrative hearings ended up
serving as a rubberstamp for managers' decisions, they would not serve the First
Amendment values and interests at stake." Estlund, supranote 43, at 1491.
164. Pub. L. No. 101-12, 103 Stat. 16 (codified at 5 U.S.C. §§1211-1219, 12211222, 3352 (2006)).
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place in matters of reporting waste, fraud, or abuse. 16 5 But
even after passage of the 1989 law, Professor Estlund was able
to conclude, based on findings from a 1992 report, that "many
employees who observe wrongdoing do not report it, that many
of those who do so perceive employer retaliation, albeit of a
comparatively mild variety, and that many of those who do not
report wrongdoing attribute their unwillingness to speak out to
the fear of retaliation." 16 6 Indeed, in 2007 Congress seriously
considered the first "enhancement" to the WPA in eighteen
years. 16 7 Currently, however, fear of retaliation in the federal
workplace for unwanted speech remains a substantial issue in
the federal civil service. 168 Since 1982, these concerns have
been raised by federal employees in front of the MSPB, either
in whistleblowing suits or in First Amendment retaliation

165. Estlund, supra note 144, at 119 n.71.
166. Id. at 120.
167. Government
Accountability
Project,
House Approves
Landmark
Whistleblower Legislation (Mar. 14, 2007), http://www.whistleblower.org/
content/press-detail.cfm?press id=831 ("The Government Accountability Project
(GAP) hailed this evening's House of Representatives floor vote approving H.R.
985, the Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act, legislation that overhauls
federal whistleblower law. The vote was 229-0 by Democrats, and 102-94 among
Republicans."). The bill is currently pending in the Senate. The Bill would extend whistleblower protections to national security employees, employees of government contractors, and employees of science-based agencies. House Committee
on Oversight and Government Reform, Whistleblower Protection Enhancement
Act of 2007 (Feb. 13, 2007), http://oversight.house.gov/story.asp?ID=1172.
It
would also expand the "scope of disclosures protected under current law .... [and]
clarify[ ] that 'any' disclosure regarding waste, fraud, or abuse means 'without restriction as to time, place, form, motive, context, or prior disclosure' and includes
formal or informal communication." Rep. Henry A. Waxman, Bill Summary of
The Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2007, http://oversight.house.
gov/documents/20070213145031-52587.pdf.
Perhaps most importantly, it would
provide an escape-hatch from MSPB/Federal Circuit procedures altogether if the
MSPB does not act on a case within 180 days. Id. However, unlike the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission, the MSPB-designated AJ does hear cases
fairly quickly and so this provision might not provide adequate relief from the
current system. See Edward H. Passman & Bryan J. Schwartz, In the Name of
Security, Insecurity: The Trend to Diminish Federal Employees' Rights, 21 LAB.
LAW. 57, 62 (2005) ("The MSPB regulations expedite the hearing process for adverse actions and other statutory appeals, strongly encouraging MSPB administrative judges (AJs) to issue initial decisions within 120 days.").
168. See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 441 (2006) (Souter, J., dissenting)
('Most significantly, federal employees have been held to be unprotected for
statements made in connection with normal employment duties [under the WPA],
the very speech the majority says will be covered ....
). See also Estlund, supra
note 144, at 142 ("[T]he [federal] study injects a strong cautionary note, for it suggests a fairly high level of managerial hostility and employee 'silence' (failure to
report perceived wrongdoing) even in the most legally protected environment.").
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suits. 169 With this Article's focus on the First Amendment, the
question remains: how effectively is the MSPB addressing the
170
First Amendment concerns of federal employees?
1.

The Structure and Characteristics of the MSPB

The answer appears to be based largely on the structure
and characteristics of the MSPB, which hears appeals of personnel actions brought by over two million covered federal employees. 17 1 As part of the Executive Branch, the MSPB describes itself as "serv[ing] as an independent, bipartisan guardian of the merit systems under which Federal employees
work." 172 Yet, there remains a question concerning independ173
ence because members of the MSPB are political appointees.
With its full complement, the MSPB consists of three mem-

169. "In the context of an adverse action against a public employee, the [whistleblowing] rights under section 2302(b)(8)(A) (prohibition of reprisal) and the
First Amendment's right to free speech have been considered coextensive rights."
Fiorillo v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, Bureau of Prisons, 795 F.2d 1544, 1549 (Fed Cir.
1986) (citing Gerlach v. FTC, 9 M.S.P.R. 268 (1981)). This article focuses on the
First Amendment, but the impact that the federal whistleblower statutes have on
this area of the law cannot be ignored. The presence of such whistleblower laws
has given federal employees alternative means to hold their government employers accountable, but has also proven something else: that such laws do not effectively fill the gap left by the lack of First Amendment protection, contrary to Justice Kennedy's assertions in Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421-23.
170. See Estlund, supra note 43, at 1491 ("While the experience of employees
with First Amendment claims under the federal civil service laws, where these
claims were channeled by Bush v. Lucas, would be instructive, it would be difficult to evaluate that experience and to extrapolate to the much larger and more
varied universe of state and local employment."). I do not attempt, however, to
undertake the difficult extrapolation of the federal experience to state and local
employment in this article.
171. There are approximately three million federal workers in the United
States. See William F. West & Robert F. Durant, Merit, Management, and Neutral Competence: Lessons from the U.S. Merit Systems ProtectionBoard, FY 1988 FY 1997, 60 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 111, 112 (2000). Two-thirds, or approximately two
million employees, are covered by the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 and the
procedures of the MSPB. Id.
172. MSPB.GOV, Welcome from Neil A.G. McPhie, available at http://
www.mspb.gov/sites/mspb/default.aspx (last visited Aug. 3, 2008).
173. In this vein, Tom Devine, legal director for the Government Accountability
Project ("GAP") in Washington D.C., contends: 'These [Board Member positions]
are stepping stones for bigger and better things. They know the way to get ahead
in the administration is not to support whistle-blowers who embarrass presidents." Timothy W. Maier, Entrapping the whistle-blowers - efforts to stop government corruption, INSIGHT ON THE NEWS, Feb. 2, 1998, available at http://findarticles.comlplarticles/mi_ml571/is-n4vl4/ai_20212840 (last visited Aug. 3,
2008).
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bers, 174 no more than two members from any one political
party. 17 5 The members are approved by the Senate and serve
176
overlapping seven-year terms.
The MSPB received over 8500 appeals of civil service
personnel decisions in 2006.177 Of these, about fifty percent in
any given year involve adverse employment action claims, including terminations, suspensions, demotions, failures to promote, and other adverse employment actions. 17 8 The standard
in such cases is whether adverse employment actions are supported by such cause as will promote the efficiency of the public
service. 179 Most of these appeals are initially heard by AJs designated by the MSPB at five regional offices throughout the
country. 18 0 Unsuccessful parties before the AJs (mostly employees) may file petitions for review ("PFRs") with the
MSPB. 18 1 In recent years, there have been between 1000 and
2000 PFRs, with the large majority (anywhere from eighty-four
to ninety-four percent) resulting in the MSPB affirming the

174. West & Durant, supra note 171. The President has the ability to designate the chairperson. Id. The current members of the Board are Chairman
Neil A.G. McPhie (Republican) and Vice Chairwoman Mary M. Rose
(Republican), MSPB.gov, Board Members, http://www.mspb.gov/sites/mspb/pages/
About%20MSPB.aspx (last visited Aug. 3, 2008). Chairman McPhie is an attorney, while Vice-Chair Rose is not. Id. Vice-Chair Rose has served in many political capacities and was employed by the conservative Heritage Foundation. See id.
175. West & Durant, supra note 171. See also Carol Goldberg, Chambers
Termination Upheld - Appeal Planned, PUBLIC EMPLOYEES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSIBILITY, Sept. 21, 2006, available at http://www.peer.org/news/
news-id.php?row_id=753 (observing that current Board has two Republicans and
one Democrat) (last visited Aug. 3, 2008).
176. 5 U.S.C. § 1202 (2006). The seven-year term would seem to help insulate
the Members from political influence, but the analysis of MSPB First Amendment
cases appears to undermine this theory. See infra Part III.B.2.
Board,
FY 2006 Performance and
Systems Protection
177. Merit
Accountability Report (PAR) 7 (Nov. 16, 2006), available at http://www.mspb.gov/
netsearch/viewdocs.aspx?docnumber=277562&version=277871&application=
ACROBAT (last visited Aug. 3, 2008). By contrast, in the period from 1988-97, it
handled 6500 to 7500 appeals. West & Durant, supra note 171, at 113.
178. West & Durant, supra note 171, at 113. The other fifty percent primarily
involve reductions-in-force and retiree benefit claims. Id.
179. VAUGHAN, supra note 11, at § 12.01, 12-2. This has been the standard
since 1912. Id.
180. West & Durant, supra note 171, at 113. The MSPB has the power by
statute to delegate cases to AJs. 5 U.S.C. § 1204(g) (2006) ("The Board may delegate the performance of any of its administrative functions under this title to any
employee of the Board."). Thus, AJs are actually considered to be employees of
the MSPB. Decisions from the administrative judges are discretionary and the
MSPB does not consider these AJ decisions precedential. VAUGHN, supra note 11,
§ 5.01 at 5-2 & n.6 (citing Horner v. Burns, 793 F.2d 196, 201 (Fed. Cir. 1986)).
181. West & Durant, supra note 171, at 113.
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Ad's decision. 182 The large percentage of unchanged awards is
based on the relatively high standard a PFR must meet in order to be reviewed by the MSPB. Petitions are granted "only
when significant new evidence is presented to [the MSPB] that
was not available for consideration earlier or when the administrative judge made an error interpreting a law or regulation."1 8 3 Nevertheless, even petitions denied review may still
184
be appealed to the Federal Circuit.
Very few of the PFRs that are accepted by the MSPB involve First Amendment claims by employees.18 5 A query of
MSPB decisions involving First Amendment claims on the
Westlaw FLB-MSPB database disclosed only seventy-seven decisions from 1979 to 2007, an average of less than three per
year-this is a minuscule percentage of the more than 10,000
86
Of
decisions the MSPB issued during this same period.'
these First Amendment decisions, only twenty-three involve
any mention of the First Amendment balancing analyses under
87
Connick and Pickering.1
182. Id. at 115 (Table 2, statistics from 1990-97). Of the remaining PFRs,
about two percent are settled, three to four percent are reversed, seven to eight
percent are remanded, and two percent result in mitigated remedies. Id.
183. Heaggans v. Dep't of Defense, 101 M.S.P.R. 159, 160 (2006) (citing 5
C.F.R. § 1201.115 (2008)).
184. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1), (d) (2006).
185. Indeed, some First Amendment claims were decided against the employee
by administrative judges, denied review by the MSPB, and then affirmed on the
substance by the Federal Circuit-providing yet another route by which federal
employee constitutional claims do not receive the constitutional protection they
deserve. See, e.g., Henry v. Dep't of Navy, 902 F.2d 949, 950-51 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
186. The Westlaw query included the search terms: 'first amendment' and
Pickering or Mings or Sigman." Mings and Sigman are the primary Federal Circuit and MSPB precedent discussing Pickering rights. See Mings v. Dep't of Justice, 813 F.2d 384, 387 (Fed.Cir. 1987); Sigman v. Dep't of Air Force, 37 M.S.P.R.
352 (1988).
A similar search
on
the MSPB.gov
database
disclosed
only fifty-nine such decisions. MSPB.gov, Decisions, http://www.mspb.gov/sites/
mspb/pagesfMSPB%20Decisions.aspx (advanced search terms were " 'First
Amendment' or 'first amendment' or 'lst Amendment.' "). The reason for the discrepancy appears to be that fifteen cases from 1980-83 are inexplicably not reported in the MSPB.gov database and a few other cases are counted in Westlaw
twice if they were remanded by the Federal Circuit.
187. One of the early cases, Farris v. U.S. Postal Serv., 14 M.S.P.R. 568 (1983),
does sustain a First Amendment claim by a federal employee, but it applies a preConnick analysis that is inconsistent with the other cases decided since the 1983
Connick decision. Id. at 572-73. Other cases mention the First Amendment for
procedural or jurisdictional reasons, see, e.g., Wright v. Dep't of Army, 100
M.S.P.R. 274 (2005), and others mention First Amendment claims without deciding them, see, e.g., Wilson v. Dep't of Justice, 66 M.S.P.R. 287 (1995). In the latter
instance, this approach is followed because if the employee obtains redress under
other provisions of the civil service law, the Board finds it unnecessary to examine
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Most significantly, however, is the fact that all twentythree remaining decisions involve either a finding of no First
Amendment violation 8 8 or no decision on the First Amendment issue. 18 9 Two of the most recent Pickering MSPB cases,
discussed below, represent the pattern in almost all of the
cases decided on the merits: a finding that the employee did not
speak out on a matter of public concern under a narrow definition of public concern, followed by an alternative argument
that even if public concern speech is involved, the employee's
First Amendment rights are easily outweighed by the countervailing efficiency interests of the employer. 190 In short, outside
of Bush v. Lucas, which was decided by the MSPB's predecessor agency, there has not been a single published case decided
by the MSPB on the merits, where an employee's First
Amendment Pickeringrights have been upheld.
2.

Two Representative PickeringMSPB Cases:
Chambers and Smith

Two recent MSPB cases, Chambers v. Department of the
1 92
Interior1 9 l and Smith v. Department of Transportation, illus-

the constitutional issue. See infra note 246 and accompanying text.
188. Smith v. Dep't of Transp., 106 M.S.P.R 59 (2007); Chambers v. Dep't of
Interior, 103 M.S.P.R. 375 (2006); Heaggans v. Dep't of Defense, 101 M.S.P.R. 159
(2006) (PFR denied 2-1, but dissent filed by Chairman McPhie finding employee
had suffered no violation of First Amendment rights); Johnson v. Dep't of Justice,
65 M.S.P.R. 46 (1994); Henry v. Dep't of Navy, 40 M.S.P.R. 482 (1989); Jackson v.
Small Bus. Admin., 40 M.S.R.P. 137 (1989); Soc. Sec. Admin. v. Burris, 39
M.S.P.R. 51 (1988); Sigman v. Dep't of Air Force, 37 M.S.P.R. 352 (1988); Wenzel
v. Dep't of Interior, 33 M.S.P.R. 344 (1987); Ledeaux v. Veterans Admin., 29
M.S.P.R. 440 (1985); Osokow v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 25 M.S.P.R. 319 (1984);
Barnes v. Dep't of Army, 22 M.S.P.R. 243 (1984); Brown v. F.A.A., 21 M.S.P.R.
572 (1984); Curry v. Dep't of Navy, 13 M.S.P.R. 327 (1982); Wittenberg v. U.S.
Postal Serv., 12 M.S.P.R. 617 (1981); Prescott v. Dep't of Health & Human Servs.,
6 M.S.P.R. 252 (1981); Quarry v. Gen. Acct. Office, 3 M.S.P.R. 200 (1980).
189. Wilson v. Dep't of Justice, 66 M.S.P.R. 287, 297 (1995) ("Because the
charge does not set forth actionable misconduct, we need not reach the appellant's
claim that his speech was protected by the First Amendment."); Oliver v. Dep't of
Health & Human Servs., 34 M.S.P.R. 465 (1987) (decided as whistleblower case);
Special Counsel v. Dep't of State, 9 M.S.P.R. 363 (1982) (decided under civil service provisions); Schofield v. Veterans Admin., 7 M.S.P.R. 94, 98 (1981) (passing
on "serious constitutional question," and deciding case on statutory grounds).
190. The Chambers case, discussed in detail in Part III.B.2.a, is an exception
because it was decided based on the newly-available ground of official duty speech
available since Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006). But there is still an argument in the alternative under the Pickering balance, and of course, the case
comes out in favor of the agency.
191.
103 M.S.P.R. 375 (2006), rev'd in part, 515 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
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trate how the MSPB has historically dealt with these types of
First Amendment claims.
a.

Chambers v. Department of Interior

In Chambers v. Department of Interior, Teresa Chambers
had been appointed the Chief of the United States Park Police
in 2002.193 When Chambers became concerned about park police deployment post-9/11 and the department's lack of budgetary resources, she shared her dissatisfaction with a Washington Post reporter in comments published in December, 2003.194
Almost immediately, Chambers was placed on paid administrative leave and her superiors proposed to remove her from her
position because she had discussed security and budgetary
matters with third parties and did so without going through
her chain of command. 195 After her official termination,
Chambers brought whistleblowing and First Amendment re196
taliation claims under the civil service regulations.
The administrative law judge upheld her termination, finding that she had disclosed sensitive security and budgetary information, failed to carry out her supervisor's instructions, and
failed to follow the chain of command. 197 On the First Amendment issue, the AJ held that she did not speak as a citizen and
therefore, under Garcetti,198 had no First Amendment protection. 19 9
The MSPB granted the PFR and affirmed the Ad's deci-

sion.200 Specifically on the First Amendment claim, the MSPB
recognized that public employees have constitutional rights
under Connick and Pickering,but then looked to the applicable
Federal Circuit precedent as requiring that "[e]mployees' free
speech rights must be balanced . .. against the need of gov-

The decision on appeal is inconsequential to this analysis as it did not relate to
the First Amendment claims in Chambers.
192. 106 M.S.P.R. 59 (2007). As of the writing of this article, no appeal has
been filed.
193. Chambers, 103 M.S.P.R. at 378.
194. Id. at 380. She made similar comments to a House subcommittee staffer.
Id.
195. Id. She was officially terminated in July 2004 by the Deputy Secretary of
the Interior. Id. at 381.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 380.
198.
199.
200.

547 U.S. 410 (2006)
Chambers, 103 M.S.P.R. at 392.
Id. at 394.
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ernment agencies to exercise wide latitude in managing their
offices, without intrusive oversight by the judiciary in the name
20 1
of the First Amendment.'
Nevertheless, the MSPB decided the case under Garcetti,
finding that the employee's speech to the reporter was pursuant to her official duties and thus, not protected by the First
Amendment. 20 2 In support. of this conclusion, the MSPB noted
that Chambers had contested a gag order that would not allow
her to speak to the press under any circumstance because it
was her job to speak to the press about agency issues. 20 3 The
MSPB thus defined the scope of her job duties based on how
20 4
the MSPB believed Chambers perceived her job duties.
As I have argued elsewhere, Garcettiis a prime example of
poor judicial reasoning and opinion writing that will hopefully
go the way of Bowers v. Hardwick.20 5 Be that as it may, even
applying Garcetti to the facts of this case, not all public employee speech is created equal, 20 6 and the MSPB seems to think
that whenever a federal employee talks to a newspaper, that
employee must be talking in his or her official capacity. Yet,
the MSPB fails to do the functional analysis of job responsibilities that Garcetti requires. 20 7 Moreover, the MSPB came to its
conclusion even though the Garcetti Court specifically mentioned that a public employee speaking to a reporter on his or
her own time likely would not be speaking pursuant to official

201. Id. at 391 (citing Mings v. Dep't of Justice, 813 F.2d 384, 387 (Fed.Cir.
1987)). This version of the Pickering balance test is one that has been transformed with the government's finger heavily on the side of the government. See
infra notes 227-31 and accompanying text.
202. Id. at 392. Member Sapin dissented on the whistleblower claims, but
agreed with the majority's First Amendment conclusion. Id. at 421 (Sapin, Member, dissenting). Alternatively, just because a person talks with the press as part
of her job responsibilities does not necessarily mean that all of her conservations
with the press are job-related.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
For a discussion of the multiple problems with Garcetti, see Paul M. Secunda,
More Than Employees: Citizens Working in Government Need Better Constitutional Protectionfrom Retaliation,LEGAL TIMES, May 21, 2007.
206. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 423-25.
207. Id. at 424-25 ('The proper inquiry is a practical one. Formal job descriptions often bear little resemblance to the duties an employee actually is expected
to perform, and the listing of a given task in an employee's written job description
is neither necessary nor sufficient to demonstrate that conducting the task is
within the scope of the employee's professional duties for First Amendment purposes.").
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duties. 208 It certainly was not Chambers' duty to criticize her
employer for its security and budgetary decisions. Indeed, the
criticism is most comparable to the Pickering case itself where
the school teacher wrote a letter to a newspaper criticizing the
school district's budgetary decisions. 20 9 In short, the majority
decision by the MSPB and its legal reasoning is highly questionable and suggests a tendency on the part of some board
members to favor the interests of the federal employer over
2 10
those of the federal employee.
Because Chambers was filed prior to Garcetti, the MSPB
also concluded, in the alternative, that Chambers would have
lost her case under pre-Garcetti law. 2 1 1 The MSPB found that
although Chambers spoke out on a matter of public concern,
she lost on the Pickering balance because police officers, and
especially chiefs of police, have less First Amendment protec2 12
tion than other public employees.
This categorical approach to Pickering balancing, however,
is at odds with the required individualized balancing based on
the specific facts of the case. 2 13 Because of Chambers' serious
public safety concerns, the harm caused to working relation-

208. Id. at 423 ("Employees who make public statements outside the course of
performing their official duties retain some possibility of First Amendment protection because that is the kind of activity engaged in by citizens who do not work for
the government. The same goes for writing a letter to a local newspaper.").
209. Pickering v. Bd. of Education, 391 U.S. 563, 566-67 (1968).
210. This hunch is also based on other background evidence. For instance,
Vice-Chairman Rose, a Republican appointee, held previous positions as Deputy
Associate Director of the Office of Presidential Personnel at the White House under the current President Bush and as a 'Visiting Fellow with The Heritage
Foundation where she recruited, interviewed and recommended Presidential Appointments to the George W. Bush transition team." MSPB.gov, Board Members,
available at http://www.mspb.gov/sites/mspb/pages/About%20MSPB.aspx
(last
visited Aug. 3, 2008). The Heritage Foundation is a conservative, generally proemployer institution in Washington D.C. See The Heritage Foundation, About Us,
available at http://www.heritage.org/about ("Founded in 1973, The Heritage
Foundation is a research and educational institute -a think tank-whose mission
is to formulate and promote conservative public policies based on the principles of
free enterprise, limited government, individual freedom, traditional American
values, and a strong national defense.") (last visited Aug. 3, 2008). Less cynically,
this faulty legal analysis may be the result of what happens when members of the
Board are not attorneys, like Vice-Chairwoman Rose.
211. Chambers v. Dep't of the Interior, 103 M.S.P.R. 375, 392-93 (2006).
Member Sapin dissented on this alternative ground, but did not expound on her
reasons for doing so. Id. at 421 (Sapin, Member, dissenting).
212. Id. at 393.
213. Brown v. Dep't of Transp., FAA, 735 F.2d 543, 548 (Fed. Cir. 1984) ("It is
the duty of the court to perform a 'particularized balancing' between the competing interests.").
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ships by her criticisms outweighed the benefit to the public interest in safety, especially when one takes into account the
unique knowledge Chambers had when it came to the affairs
of the Park Police. In defense of its position, the MSPB majority stated: "[C]onsistent with the decisions cited above, the
agency had an overriding interest in not having the Chief of the
Park Police publicly question decisions made by officials who
outranked her concerning the functions and budget of the Park
Police. '2 14 Yet, if that were always the case, there would be
fewer First Amendment rights for public employees who, as
citizens, believe they are uniquely situated to bring concerns
about the government to the attention other citizens. Indeed,
the MSPB seems to recognize this when it cites a Seventh Circuit case for the proposition that "[t]he public's interest in
learning about 'corruption' or 'wrongdoing' by government officials will usually foreclose discipline against a public employee
who reveals such activities, even when the speaker is a law enforcement officer with limited First Amendment rights."2 15 But
somehow, the MSPB's decision indicates that it believes danger
to public safety is less important than other types of "wrongdoing" or "corruption," and thus the Seventh Circuit precedent
should not apply.2 16 In short, the MSPB's analysis is lacking,
superficial, and inconsistent with the type of competent legal
2 17
analysis required in these types of cases.
b.

Smith v. Department of Transportation

There is not much improvement in the MSPB's handling of
2 18 Smith involves the
Smith v. Department of Transportation.
thirty-day suspension of a Department of Transportation employee for using, in an allegedly unauthorized manner, government documents to support his equal employment opportunity
claim revolving
around
an
allegedly
racially
214. Chambers, 103 M.S.P.R. at 393.
215. Id. at 394 (citing McGreal v. Ostrov, 368 F.3d 657 (7th Cir. 2004)).
216. See id. at 393-94.
217. Adjudicatory agencies like the MSPB need to have credibility with parties
on both sides of the dispute. See Paul M. Secunda, Politics Not As Usual: Inherently Destructive Conduct, Institutional Collegiality, and the National Labor Relations Board, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 51, 54 n.11 (2004) (maintaining that in the
context of National Labor Relations Board, "[b]oard decisions driven by political
considerations negate the Board's claim of superiority in deciding labor disputes
based on industrial experience and expertise and compromise its stature as a neutral independent agency").
218. 106 M.S.P.R. 59 (2007).
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discriminatory failure to promote. 2 19 Smith claimed, among
other things, that the thirty-day suspension violated his First
Amendment right to challenge the allegedly discriminatory
promotion decision. 220 Because the AJ sustained Smith's initial appeal on other grounds, there was no need to discuss his
First Amendment claim. 22 1 However, the First Amendment
claim became relevant again when the MSPB overturned some
of the AJ's conclusions on the civil service provisions.
Although recognizing the constitutional speech rights of all
public employees under the Pickering framework, the MSPB
relied on an interpretation by the Federal Circuit that placed a
heavy thumb on the scale on the side of the government's interests. 222 Under the Mings test, " 'employees' [free speech
rights] must be balanced . . . against the need of government
agencies for 'wide latitude in managing their offices, without
intrusive oversight by the judiciary in the name of the First
Amendment.' "223 But the Federal Circuit in Mings made a
glaring legal mistake by suggesting that this "wide latitude"
language concerns the balancing of employee and employer interests under Pickering. Instead, the "wide latitude" language
concerns the threshold question of whether or not the employee
is due some First Amendment protection because he or she is
speaking on a matter of public concern. The complete quote
from Connick states, "When employee expression cannot be
fairly considered as relating to any matter of political, social, or
other concern to the community, government officials should
enjoy wide latitude in managing their offices, without intrusive
oversight by the judiciary in the name of the First Amend2 24

ment."

So only when public-employee speech is not on a matter of
public concern at all does the employer have wide latitude to
manage its offices, not when the expression is important to
public debate. When public-concern speech is involved, as the
MSPB in Smith eventually assumes for the sake of argu-

219. Id. at 63. Smith was a "Management & Program Analyst (Labor Relations Program Manager) in the Flight Standards Division of the Federal Aviation
Administration's ("FAA") Administrative Services Branch in Atlanta." Id.
220. Id. at 78.
221. Id.
222. Member Sapin dissented, but only on the holdings under the civil service
provisions. She did not address the First Amendment claims. Id. at 90-98.
223. Mings v. Dep't of Justice, 813 F.2d 384, 387 (Fed.Cir.1987) (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146 (1983)).
224. Connick, 461 U.S. at 146.
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ment, 225 a much more delicate balancing between employee
First Amendment interests and governmental efficiency issues
must be undertaken. 2 26 By citing the Federal Circuit in Mings,
the MSPB therefore compounds the twenty-year mistake by
again undertaking the wrong balancing of interests.
The MSPB also makes two mistakes in discussing whether
the filing of an equal employment opportunity ("EEO") complaint is speech on a matter of public concern. Although the
MSPB correctly recognizes that "a discussion regarding racial
relations or discrimination is a matter of public concern entitled to the full protection of the First Amendment," 2 27 it cites to
circuit court precedent for the proposition that the complaint
has to be public, 228 and that the filing of a discrimination claim
is "personal in nature and generally related to [the employee's]
229
own situation."
As to the MSPB's first point, in Givhan v. Western Line
Consolidated School District,2 30 the Court held that a racial
discrimination complaint made in a private conversation could
still be on a matter of public concern. This principle was later
reaffirmed by the Court in Rankin v. McPherson,23 1 in which
private, negative comments about the assassination attempt on
President Reagan were found to touch on matters of public concern. 232 Indeed, a closer look at the Eleventh Circuit opinion,
cited by the Smith majority, shows that the Eleventh Circuit
understood that "a court cannot determine that an utterance is
not a matter of public concern solely because the employee does
not air the concerns to the public," 2 33 though an employee's at-

225. Smith, 106 M.S.P.R. at 80.
226. Brown v. Dep't of Transp., FAA, 735 F.2d 543, 548 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
227. Smith, 106 M.S.P.R. at 79 (citing Connick, 461 U.S. at 148 n.8 (speech
protesting racial discrimination is "inherently of public concern")).
228. Id. (quoting Watkins v. Bowden, 105 F.3d 1344, 1353 (11th Cir.1997) ("In
determining whether an employee's speech relates to a matter of public concern or
to his own private interest, courts also consider the employee's attempts to make
the concern public and the employee's motivation in speaking.")).
229. Id. (citing Saulpaugh v. Monroe Cmty. Hosp, 4 F.3d 134, 143 (2d
Cir. 1993)).
230. 439 U.S. 410, 415-16 (1979).
231. 483 U.S. 378 (1987).
232. Id. at 386-87.
233. Morgan v. Ford, 6 F.3d 750, 754 n.5 (11th Cir. 1993). See also Azzaro v.
County of Allegheny, 110 F.3d 968, 978 (3d Cir. 1997) (en banc) ("[I]f the content
and circumstances of a private communication are such that the message conveyed would be relevant to the process of self-governance if disseminated to the
community, that communication is public concern speech even though it occurred
in a private context.").
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tempt at public disclosure may be relevant. However, in a
situation where the speech concerns claims of racial discrimination, which are "inherently of public concern,"234 it is not
clear how the fact that the claims were not publicly aired is
dispositive.
Similarly, the MSPB's cursory conclusion that an EEO
complaint is merely personal in nature indicates a foundational
misunderstanding of the dual purposes of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964235 and similar federal and state antidiscrimination laws. Here, the MSPB is not alone in its misunderstanding of employment discrimination law, but is joined by
the Second and Seventh Circuits in this error. 23 6 The purpose
of employment discrimination laws is both to make the individual whole from unlawful discrimination and to vindicate the
public interest in eradicating employment discrimination from
society as a whole. 2 37 To say that an EEO complaint only
serves the employee's personal purposes ignores the public interests vindicated by such laws and complaints filed by employees like Smith.2 38 This is not to say that the MSPB necessarily arrived at the wrong legal conclusion, but only that the

234. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 148 n. 8 (1983).
235. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (2000).
236. Saulpaugh v. Monroe Community Hosp., 4 F.3d 134, 143 (2d Cir. 1993)
(citing Ezekwo v. NYC Health & Hospitals Corp., 940 F.2d 775, 781 (2d Cir.
1991)); Yatvin v. Madison Metro. School Dist., 840 F.2d 412, 420 (7th Cir. 1988)).
The better view is that espoused by the en banc Third Circuit in Azzaro: "In rejecting this notion [that discrimination must be systemic to be of a public concern], we do not suggest that all public employee complaints about sexual harassment are matters of public concern. We do believe, however, that under all of
the surrounding circumstances, Azzaro's reports address a matter of public concern even though they referred to a single incident." Azzaro, 110 F.3d at 980; see
also Campbell v. Galloway, 483 F.3d 258, 269 (4th Cir. 2007) ("Complaints of sexual harassment are not per se matters of public concern; whether such complaints
are in any given case depends on the content, form and context of the complaint.
Applying that standard to this case and viewing the complaints in the light most
favorable to Campbell, we conclude that Campbell's complaints about sexual discrimination do amount to matters of public concern.").
237. See Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 771 (1976) ("[T]he denial of seniority relief to victims of illegal racial discrimination in hiring is permissible 'only for reasons which, if applied generally, would not frustrate the central statutory purposes of eradicatingdiscrimination throughout the economy and
making persons whole for injuries suffered through past discrimination."'(quoting
Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 421 (1975) (emphasis added))); see
also EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 292 (2002) (recognizing that the
EEOC has the statutory authority to vindicate both the private and public interests served by Title VII).
238. See Albemarle, 422 U.S. at 421 (establishing eradication of discrimination
throughout the economy as one of the central statutory purposes of Title VII).
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MSPB lacks the necessary tools to undertake the sensitive balancing of relevant interests that need to be considered in cases
such as Smith. As a result, federal employees' First Amendment rights to free speech are unnecessarily sacrificed.
Perhaps the lack of neutrality and competency on the part
of the MSPB would be bearable and less worrisome if there
were meaningful judicial review by an Article III court. Unfortunately, as the next section illustrates, that is not the case.
C.

The Federal Circuit Experience Handling First
Amendment Pickering Claims

As noted above, the Federal Circuit hears appeals from the
MSPB concerning adverse employment decisions. 2 39 There
does not appear to be much disagreement in how First Amendment Pickering free speech claims are handled by the MSPB as
opposed to how they are treated by the Federal Circuit Court of
Appeals. Indeed, in 2006, the MSPB reported that the Federal
Circuit affirmed ninety-three percent of the MSPB's decisions.2 40 The most likely reason for this high affirmation rate
is the highly deferential standard of review in such cases: "The
decision of the MSPB must be affirmed unless we find it to be
arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with law; obtained without procedures required by
law, rule, or regulation having been followed; or unsupported
by substantial evidence. '24 1 In other words, this is in no way
the type of review a First Amendment claim brought directly to
a federal district court would receive if brought under Bivens or
24 2
a §1983 federal analogue.
In fact, the First Amendment MSPB cases involving the
free speech Pickering analysis for federal employees follows
this overall pattern to the same degree. Every single Federal
Circuit case that decided a First Amendment issue on the mer239. See Robert G. Vaughn, Ethics in Government and the Vision of Public Service, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 417, 425 n.35 (1990) ('The United States Circuit
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit exercises exclusive jurisdiction over most
appeals of federal employees taken from personnel actions.") (citing 5 U.S.C. §
7703(b)(1), (d) (2006) and VAUGHN, supra note 11, at § 17.02[2], 17-14.1). The
MSPB has held this role since 1982. 5 U.S.C. § 7703; Federal Court Improvement
Act of 1982, 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (2000).
240. MSPB Performance and Accountability Report (PAR), supra note 177, at
5-6.
241. Holland v. Dep't of Air Force, 31 F.3d 1118, 1120 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (citing 5
U.S.C. § 7703(c)).
242. See supra Part II.A; see infra IV.A.
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its found in favor of the government agency. 243 This is not surprising from the perspective that "[t]he opinions of the courts
place great emphasis on hierarchy of command in defining government interests, including interests in efficiency. ' 244 Overall,
the last twenty-five years have witnessed the Federal Circuit
uphold ten out of ten decisions for federal agency employers on
the merits. 24 5 Each of these cases found against the First
Amendment rights of public employees or, in the alternative,
declared that the court did not have jurisdiction over the First
Amendment claim or that it was unnecessary to decide the constitutional claim because of the resolution of the civil service
statutory cause of action.
Both of these latter two procedural methods of dismissing
federal employee First Amendment claims also highlight the
shortcomings of the MSPB/Federal Circuit administrative
scheme. For instance, if the Federal Circuit overturns the
MSPB and reinstates an employee who suffered an adverse
employment decision based on civil service provisions, the court
finds that it need not address the First Amendment claim at
all. 246 Although this is consistent with the Ashwander doctrine
of constitutional avoidance, 247 this approach cheapens the
243. Kohl v. U.S. Postal Service, 115 F. App'x 49 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Guise v.
Dep't of Justice, 330 F.3d 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Henry v. Dep't of Navy, 902 F.2d
949 (Fed. Cir. 1990); Banks v. Garrett, 901 F.2d 1084 (Fed. Cir. 1990); England v.
Dep't of Treasury, 889 F.2d 1100 (Table) (Fed. Cir. 1989); Woodward v. United
States, 871 F.2d 1068 (Fed Cir. 1989); Mings v. Dep't of Justice, 813 F.2d 384
(Fed. Cir. 1987); Stanek v. Dep't of Transp., 805 F.2d 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1986);
Fiorillo v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, Bureau of Prisons, 795 F.2d 1544 (Fed. Cir. 1986);
Brown v. Dep't of Transp., FAA, 735 F.2d 543 (Fed. Cir. 1984). There were an additional eight cases going back to 1969 that discuss First Amendment rights of
federal employees, but because these cases were not decided by the Federal Circuit they were not considered in this analysis.
244. Vaughn, supra note 239 (also discussing cases outside of the First Amendment).
245. Neither the Chambers nor Stone case, discussed in detail above, are part
of this analysis as the Stone decision was not appealed and the Chambers decision
is pending appeal on non-First Amendment issues. See Smith v. Dep't of Transp.,
106 M.S.P.R. 59 (2007); Chambers v. Dep't of Interior, 103 M.S.P.R. 375 (2006).
246. See, e.g., Holland v. Dep't of Air Force, 31 F.3d 1118, 1122 (Fed. Cir. 1994)
(because agency personnel decision was not sustained under civil service provisions, "we do not reach the question whether the cited Air Force regulations, if
they supported Holland's demotion based on his statements of belief, would run
afoul of the First Amendment").
247. See Pamela S. Karlan, The ParadoxicalStructure of ConstitutionalLitigation, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1913, 1929 n.90 (2007) (citing Ashwander v. TVA, 297
U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring)) ('inder the so-called 'Ashwander
doctrine,' the Supreme Court prefers that cases be decided on statutory rather
than constitutional grounds when possible.").
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value of constitutional rights and the importance of constitutional adjudication.
Perhaps even more problematic is the situation where, because the underlying prohibited personnel action does not
amount to a covered employment decision under the civil service laws, the Federal Circuit finds that the MSPB did not have
proper jurisdiction over the claim and thus, the court cannot
hear the claim either. 248 Yet, if the federal employee initially
sought to bring the action as a Bivens-type First Amendment
claim, it would certainly fail under Bush v. Lucas.2 49 In other
words, in cases the MSPB lacks jurisdiction, the employee is
left without a First Amendment claim at all, let alone a mean250
ingful or effective one.
The high affirmation rate is to be expected for at least one
other reason. As a general matter, federal courts of appeal
usually defer to the expert agencies that have been given broad
discretion in interpreting the statutes over which they have authority.2 5 1 This leads to the deferential standard of review
cited to above. 25 2 Yet, the affirmation rate of the MSPB is
much higher than the rates for similar agency adjudicatory
bodies like the National Labor Relations Board, the Patent and
Trademark Office, or the Immigration and Naturalization Service. 25 3 Something else is afoot. Although hard to prove, it
248. Manning v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 742 F.2d 1424 (Fed Cir. 1984) (in performance review reprisal cases, upholding basic principle that MSPB jurisdiction
extends only to those actions made appealable by law, rule, or regulation and
plaintiffs First Amendment claim was not therefore appealable); Rosano v. Dep't
of the Navy, 699 F.2d 1315, 1318-20 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (same outcome with regard
to federal employee health benefits plan claim). This is so even though Bush v.
Lucas stated, misleadingly in retrospect, that "[c]onstitutional challenges to
agency action, such as the First Amendment claims raised by petitioner, are fully
cognizable within this [regulatory] system." Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 386
(1983).
249. See supra Part II.C.
250. The Federal Circuit's unhelpful response to this state of affairs is that,
"we see no support in Bush for the contention that there must be an administrative remedy for every constitutional violation alleged by a federal employee."
Manning, 742 F.2d at 1429. So much for a "comprehensive" administrative
scheme.
251. This is sometimes referred to as "Chevron deference." See Patrick M.
Garry, Accommodating The Administrative State: The InterrelationshipBetween
The Chevron And Nondelegation Doctrines, 38 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 921, 941 (2006)
("Chevron[, 467 U.S. 837 (1984),] deference means that the courts must sanction
any rational interpretation the agency makes. This rule of deference prevails
even if a court would have reached a different conclusion had it considered the issue de novo.").
252. See supra note 155 and accompanying text; supra note 241.
253. See Peter H. Schuck & E. Donald Elliott, To the Chevron Station: An EmHeinOnline -- 79 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1141 2008
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might have to do with the way MSPB members are appointed
and their lack of competence as either non-attorneys or adjudicators who lack familiarity with the ins-and-outs of the
Pickering framework. 25 4 With time comes experience, but the
affirmation rate suggests that the Federal Circuit is none too
eager to disagree with the MSPB on federal personnel manners. In addition, time does not provide much experience given
that one Westlaw law inquiry establishes that the Federal Circuit heard a total of only seventy-nine First Amendment cases
in its twenty-five year existence,2 5 5 but heard approximately
5741 patent cases during that same period. 256
In all, the Federal Circuit's track record of only finding for
agencies on federal employees' First Amendment Pickering
claims does not inspire confidence, suggests some political bias
in the system toward agencies, and highlights the relative lack
of experience of the court in these types of constitutional matters. As a result, the only Article III review that these claims
are receiving is not meaningful or effective under any definition.
IV. REVITALIZING THE FIRST AMENDMENT PICKERING RIGHTS
OF FEDERAL EMPLOYEES
The first thing that strikes one who studies Federal Circuit
and MSPB First Amendment Pickering cases is their sheer
paucity. Some of this lack of cases is no doubt due to employees bringing similar claims under the Whistleblower Protection

piricalStudy of FederalAdministrative Law, 1990 DUKE L.J. 984, 1013-22 (1990)
(finding that from 1984 to 1985, federal circuit courts affirmed in full seventy-five
percent of NLRB orders, eighty-three percent of Immigration and Naturalization
Service orders, eighty-one percent of Patent and Trademark Office orders, and
ninety percent of MSPB orders). Since 1985, the affirmance rate for MSPB orders
has only increased. See supra note 240 and accompanying text.
254. Alternatively, it might be attributable to the fact that, "[m]any of [the
Federal Circuit's] non-precedential opinions are in pro se appeals by federal employees from decisions of the Merit Systems Protection Board. Because these cases
are often poorly briefed, it is easy to miss potentially important legal issues."
Penelope Pether, Sorcerers, Not Apprentices: How Judicial Clerks And Staff Attorneys Impoverish U.S. Law, 39 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1, 16 (2007) (citing ROBERT
TIMOTHY REAGAN ET AL., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., Citing Unpublished Opinions in
FederalAppeals 75 app. (2005) (quoting Judge JF-2)).
255. There were actually 142 results, but the Court of Claims, the Federal Circuit predecessor, heard the other cases prior to 1982.
256. The queries run in the CTAF (Westlaw Federal Circuit database) were:
'first amendment' % patent! copyright! trademark!" and "patent! and da (after
1982)" respectively.
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Act ("WPA"), but the comparison between similar claims
brought by state employees under § 1983 tells a different story.
Whereas there are approximately twenty MSPB decisions and
ten Federal Circuit decisions in the last twenty-five years on
First Amendment Pickering claims, there are literally thou257
sands, if not more, state and local First Amendment claims.
The difference cannot only be attributed to the availability
of WPA claims for at least two reasons. First, many state and
local employees who have whistleblower statutory claims, also
bring First Amendment claims. 258 Second, the available empirical evidence suggests that federal employees who bring
claims under the WPA are highly unsuccessful; 2 59 so unsuccessful that Congress is currently considering enhancements to
260
employee protections under the WPA.
The better answer appears to be that federal employees
are not bringing First Amendment claims because there is no
reason to think that such claims have any chance of success.
Who can blame federal employees for this assumption? When
every single MSPB and Federal Circuit First Amendment
Pickering case decided on the merits comes out in favor of the
employer, employees and their attorneys learn very quickly
that these adjudicators lack the requisite neutral competence
and that these types of claims are simply a waste of time and
money. 26 1 All this leads to a call, in the next two subsections,
for a revitalization of federal employee First Amendment
Pickering claims, either under Bivens or an extension of § 1983
to violations under color of federal law.

257. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
258. For example, state and local employees in New York and Pennsylvania
may bring state statutory whistleblower claims. See N.Y. CIVIL SERVICE LAW §
75-b (McKinney 2006); 43 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 1421-28 (2005).
259. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
260. See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
261. Federal employees may instead prefer to proceed under a negotiated
grievance procedure rather than proceeding through the MSPB. See Don Cheney,
Postal Employees Should Think Twice Before Appealing Case to MSPB,
POSTALREPORTER.COM BLOG, Feb. 12, 2007, available at http://www.postalreporter.com/news/2007/02/12/postal-employees-should-think-twice-beforeappealing-case-to-mspb ("Kenneth Jones vs. US Postal Service[, 216 F. App'x 986
(Fed. Cir. 2007),] illustrates why postal employees should think twice before appealing their discipline to the Merit Systems Protection Board. They have a better chance of success in the grievance procedure.") (last visited Aug. 3, 2008).
Whether arbitrators will be better able to decide these Pickering cases in a neutrally competent way is an interesting question, but beyond the scope of this article.
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Bring Bivens Back for FederalEmployees' First
Amendment Claims

The purpose of this section is not to argue that Bush v. Lucas was wrongly decided in 1982. Indeed, it would be hard to
do so considering that it was a unanimous decision, with the
author of Bivens himself, Justice Brennan, joining the opinion. 26 2 Rather than attack the logic of Bush, this section argues that its underlying assumptions are no longer valid
twenty-five years after it was decided.
Most specifically and to the point, federal employees are
not able to receive a meaningful or effective remedy for their
First Amendment claims under the CSRA of 1978.263 Empirical analyses do not lie and the lack of any success of such
claims at the MSPB or federal appellate level explains why
there is little First Amendment activity. It is certainly not because the federal civil service has become magically immune
from everyday employment disputes. Instead, employees are
turning to the equally deficient WPA, 264 swallowing hard and
doing nothing, 26 5 or just leaving federal service and taking
2 66
their talents elsewhere.
If the CSRA of 1978 were providing a meaningful, effective
remedy for the federal employees' First Amendment claims,
there would be every reason to argue that the Bivens remedy in

262. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
263. As argued previously, "meaningful remedies" appears to be the touchstone
for determining whether a statutory alternative is constitutionally adequate for
vindicating individuals' constitutional rights. See Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367,
386 (1983) ("As the record in this case demonstrates, the Government's comprehensive scheme is costly to administer, but it provides meaningful remedies for
employees who may have been unfairly disciplined for making critical comments
about their agencies."); id. at 390 (Marshall, J., concurring) ("[A] different case
would be presented if Congress had not created a comprehensive scheme ... that
affords a remedy that is substantially as effective as a damage action.").
264. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
265. This conclusion is supported by analysis of the First Amendment cases
that the MSPB has decided. There have only been four such cases in the 1990s
and 2000s, illustrating a belief among federal employees and their representatives
that they cannot receive meaningful redress from the MSPB for their First
Amendment free speech claims. See supra note 188 and accompanying text.
266. Statement of Senator Daniel K. Akaka, Subcommittee on the Oversight of
Government Management, the Federal Workforce, and the District of Columbia,
Building the 21st Century Federal Workforce: Assessing Progress in Human Capital Management (July 20, 2004),
http://akaka.senate.gov/public/
index.cfm?FuseAction=speeches.home&month=7&year=2004&releaseid=762
("We may be winning the hearts and minds of Americans seeking employment
with the federal government, but we are still losing the talent war.").
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this context is not necessary. Unfortunately, that is just not
the case. Since the Bush case, there has not been one instance
of a Pickering analysis being applied by the MSPB or Federal
Circuit in which the employee comes out on top. 26 7 This is truly
remarkable.
Nor is there reason to believe that there should not be a
Bivens claim because of "special factors counseling hesitation."
When Bush was decided, the thought was that Congress spent
a hundred years putting together a comprehensive civil service
system that would attract and keep the best and brightest federal employees. 26 8 It was universally thought that Congress
had the institutional competence to formulate a civil service
system that would prevent partisanship and provide the best
26 9
employees for the national government.
A claim is not being made that the CSRA of 1978 has not
worked at all. Indeed, outside of the First Amendment context,
there is every reason to believe that the system is working as
well as one might expect. A claim is being made, however, that
there is no further reason to defer to the institutional competence of Congress in not recognizing a direct constitutional
remedy for First Amendment free speech claims for federal
employees. For these claims at least, Congress has shown itself singularly incompetent in trying to protect the constitutional rights of federal employees. At the end of the day, it
does not matter whether this is because the MSPB is not neutral enough, 270 not competent enough, 2 7 1 or not experienced
267. The concept of the "inexorable zero" in disparate impact law under Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 comes to mind here. In pattern and practice
group employment discrimination cases, courts rely on statistics to determine
whether an employer has a standard operating procedure of discriminating
against certain protected groups, like minorities. See Intern. Bhd. of Teamsters v.
United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977). In such cases, when no minorities have been
hired at all by the employer, "fine tuning of the statistics [do not] obscure[ ] the
glaring absence of minority [employees].... [T]he company's inability to rebut the
inference of discrimination came not from a misuse of statistics but from 'the inexorable zero."' Id. at 342 n.23.
268. See Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 389 (1983) ("Congress is in a far better
position than a court to evaluate the impact of a new species of litigation between
federal employees on the efficiency of the civil service.").
269. Id. ("Congress has a special interest in informing itself about the efficiency and morale of the Executive Branch. In the past it has demonstrated its
awareness that lower-level government employees are a valuable source of information, and that supervisors might improperly attempt to curtail their subordinates' freedom of expression.").
270. Compelling evidence of partisan divides in other politically-appointed, adjudicative agencies does appear to exist. See Ronald Turner, Ideological Voting on
the National Labor Relations Board, 8 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 707, 711 (2006)
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enough with these types of claims. 272 What matters is that the
constitutional rights of federal employees are being ignored
and sacrificed at an alarming rate.
The only real solution is to recognize that when it comes to
First Amendment federal employee Pickering rights, Bivens
remedies provide the best alternative of all the options. Under
Bivens, federal employees will be able to take their free speech
claims directly to an independent Article III court, which has
much experience adjudicating such claims under § 1983.273
Applying standards similar to those used under § 1983, federal
court adjudication once again will assure a neutrally competent
arbiter of federal employees' constitutional rights. Moreover,
such claims, with the ability to hold individual federal supervisors and managers directly liable for damages, may lead to a
greater deterrent effect than is currently possible under the ex274
isting regime.
There may be some who claim that this proposal does nothing less than open the proverbial "floodgates of litigation." But
the second Justice Harlan answered this criticism well in his
concurring opinion in Bivens:
[T]he question appears to be how Fourth Amendment interests rank on a scale of social values compared with, for example, the interests of stockholders defrauded by misleading proxies. Judicial resources, I am well aware, are
increasingly scarce these days. Nonetheless, when we automatically close the courthouse door solely on this basis [of
inundating courts with Fourth Amendment claims], we implicitly express a value judgment on the comparative impor5
tance of classes of legally protected interests. 27

("The only claim made in this Article is that ideology has been a persistent and, in
many instances, a vote-predictive factor when the [National Labor Relations]
Board decides certain legal issues.").
271. See supra note 217 and accompanying text.
272. See supra note 186 and accompanying text.
273. Wilkie v. Robbins, 127 S. Ct. 2588, 2615-16 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("Because we have no reason to believe that
state employees are any more or less respectful of Fifth Amendment rights than
federal agents, § 1983 provides a controlled experiment.").
274. See Louise Weinberg, The Monroe Mystery Solved: Beyond The "Unhappy
History" Theory Of Civil Rights Litigation, 1991 B.Y.U. L. REV. 737, 762-63 ("An
action against an individual may have greater deterrence value, especially since
punitive damages are available under Bivens.").
275. Wilkie, 127 S. Ct. at 2613 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) (quoting Bivens, 403 U.S. 388, 410-411 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring) (citation omitted)).
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In short, "[t]he 'floodgates' argument . . . has been rehearsed and rejected before." 2 76 In any event, the statistics of
§ 1983 cases just do not bear out that such a flood would arise
from the recognition of a Bivens claim in this context. 277 Even
with a much larger number of state and local employees in this
country, 278 federal courts still adequately handle existing
§ 1983 causes of action. 279 It is hard to believe that another
three million federal employees, about one-sixth the number of
their state and local counterparts, will cause irreconcilable
problems for the courts.
In short, it is time to face the fact that the civil service
scheme does not adequately vindicate constitutional First
Amendment Pickering rights of federal employees. Therefore,
it is time to permit Bivens claims in this context.
B.

The Alternative: Section 1983 for FederalEmployees

There is, of course, another way to provide more effective
constitutional protection for federal employees: Congress could
provide a statutory-based, § 1983-like action for federal employees. 2 80 All that it would take would be for Congress to pass
a Civil Rights Act that would either add "under color ... of any
federal or State law" to § 1983 or propose a new statute with
"under color ... of any State law" substituted with "under color
. . . of any federal law." 28 1 After that, all other principles of
municipal liability, including sovereign and qualified immunity, under § 1983, would apply equally to federal officers' vio276. Id.
277. Schwab & Eisenberg, supra note 12, at 643 (concluding there has not been
an uncontrolled mushrooming of cases in the federal courts under Section 1983).
278. There are about three million federal employees and eighteen million
state and local employees. West & Durant, supra note 171; U.S. DEP'T OF
COMMERCE, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES
298 (2004-2005) (Table No. 453) (figure from 2002).
279. Schwab & Eisenberg, supra note 12, at 642-43 ("Both national data published by the Administrative Office of the United States Courts and our findings
about a key federal district suggest that the image of a civil rights litigation explosion is overstated and borders on myth.").
280. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics,
403 U.S. 388, 427-28 (1971) (Black, J., dissenting) ("If it wanted to do so, Congress could, of course, create a remedy against federal officials who violate the
Fourth Amendment in the performance of their duties."). See also Seamon, supra
note 33, at 758-59.
281. This approach appears to be similar to what Justice Ginsburg suggests in
her Wilkie dissent. Wilkie, 127 S. Ct. at 2618 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) ("If Congress wishes to codify and further define the
Bivens remedy, it may do so at anytime.").
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lations of the Constitution. 28 2 Compensatory and punitive
damages would be available against individual federal govern2 83
ment officials accused of violating the Constitution.
This legislative approach has the advantage of being less
problematic from a separation of powers standpoint and arguably would place the power to create a remedy in the branch of
government where it rightfully belongs. 284 It suffers from one
glaring shortcoming, however, at least in the broad form proposed. 28 5 It would not just apply to federal employees and the
First Amendment, as the proposed Bivens solution would, but
would apply to all violations of the Constitution by all federal
officials. If Congress felt comfortable doing that, it would have
done so a long time ago. In the end, it seems impracticable in
the current political environment that Congress would act to
codify the Bivens remedy.
CONCLUSION

There has been little controversy over the substitution of
the civil service regime for First Amendment litigation as a re-

282. See supra Part II.A. See also Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 500 (1978)
("[I]n the absence of congressional direction to the contrary, there is no basis for
according to federal officials a higher degree of immunity from liability when sued
for a constitutional infringement as authorized by Bivens than is accorded state
officials when sued for the identical violation under § 1983.").
283. See supra note 69 and accompanying text. Damage actions would not be
permitted against the United States because the United States has not waived
sovereign immunity for constitutional violations. See supra note 79.
284. Newman, supra note 100, at 472-73 (maintaining that diminished state of
Bivens jurisprudence points to a trend that reflects the adoption of the same separation of powers concerns of the Bivens dissenters). But see George D. Brown,
Letting Statutory Tails Wag Constitutional Dogs-Have the Bivens Dissenters
Prevailed?, 64 IND. L.J. 263, 294-95 (1989) (maintaining that constitutional nature of Bivens should mean less deference to Congress); Gene R. Nichol, Bivens,
Chilicky, and ConstitutionalDamages Claims, 75 VA. L. REV. 1117, 1153 (1989)
(arguing that implying constitutional damage remedies is an indispensable component of constitutional oversight).
285. Professor Seamon has explored the possibility of a narrower Section 1983
revision which would apply to actions taken by federal agents under the color of
the federal law with regard to torture claims. Seamon, supra note 33, at 759 ("A
narrower version would create a cause of action against any person acting under
color of federal law who 'subjects, or causes to be subjected,' another person to 'torture,' a term that would be defined-either in the same statute or by reference to
one of the existing statutory definitions of the term."). Similarly, Congress could
pass a narrower law which would create a cause of action against federal officials
and entities that interfere with the freedom of expression of federal employees. I
would think the likelihood of such a bill ever being enacted, however, is very slim.
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sult of the Supreme Court's decision in Bush v. Lucas.2 86 But
the emperor has no clothes. Not only do federal civil service
administrative proceedings not have all the due process and
remedial bells and whistles that we have come to expect in litigation before an independent Article III federal court, but federal employees have also, by and large, ceased to bring First
Amendment claims under this administrative scheme.
Federal employees no longer believe that they can receive
substantive justice for their First Amendment Pickering rights
under the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978. Indeed, this Article's analysis of MSPB and Federal Circuit decisions involving
federal employees' claims has been undertaken to answer one
crucial question: are these agencies neutrally competent to protect federal employees' First Amendment rights? 28 7 The answer, based on a review of case law, is a resounding no. Not a
single published case, at either the administrative or appellate
level, has upheld the First Amendment rights of a federal employee on the merits under the Pickeringanalysis.
The solution to this inequitable state of affairs can only be
accomplished by a reinvigoration of federal employees' First
Amendment free speech rights through overturning the decision in Bush v. Lucas and implying a direct Bivens remedy. Alternatively, § 1983 could be expanded by Congress to provide a
statutory basis for federal employees to bring constitutional
tort claims against federal agents for violating their constitutional rights under color of federal law. Only by taking one of
these necessary steps can the public be "assured that federal
officials w[ill] be subject to the same constraints as state officials in dealing with the fundamental rights of the people who
' 28 8
dwell in this land.

286. But see Joan Steinman, Backing Off Bivens and the Ramifications of this
Retreat for the Vindication of FirstAmendment Rights, 83 MICH. L. REV. 269, 270
(1984) (predicting presciently in 1984 that Bush and other Bivens cases could "increase the risk that first amendment rights will be under-enforceable, even unconstitutionally so").
287. This is crucial because "[tihe very essence of civil liberty certainly consists
in the right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he
receives an injury." Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 163 (1803).
288. Wilkie v. Robbins, 127 S. Ct. 2588, 2618 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
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